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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Agent is a third party acting on behalf of a principal, and herein means an entity that has been 
contracted by an institution and having been approved  by the Central Bank  to provide the 
services of the institution on behalf of the institution in the manner specified in the CBK 
Guideline (CBK, 2016). 
Agency banking  is a partnership with non-banks,  and can be any business ranging from  
grocery stores, lottery kiosks, pharmacies, and post offices  acting as  distribution outlets for 
financial services (Kumar et al; 2006). Agency banking takes services to the convenience of 
consumers, by reducing transport costs.  
Financial inclusion is defined as the process of having and ensuring access to financial 
services which are timely, affordable and adequate to the vulnerable groups like the low 
income earners. “Financial inclusion means universal access, at a reasonable cost to a wide 
range of financial services” (Mugo & Kilonzo, 2017). 
Fraud is defined as an act involving intentional deceit and attempted concealment to gain an 
advantage. Occupational fraud is where an employee uses their occupation and position for 
personal enrichment by deliberately misusing the organizational resources (ACFE, 2006). 
Fraud risk Management is a process of understanding, recognizing and dealing with fraud 












Agency banking is a fairly new model in Kenya which has attracted attention from 
researchers because of its contribution towards financial inclusion. Fraud has been identified 
as one of the challenges in agency banking but it is not clear which fraud risk management 
practices are adopted in agency banking. This prompted the need to investigate these 
practices, their effect on level of activity by agent banks and to establish whether there is any 
association between fraud and agent banks characteristics. This was a descriptive and 
explanatory study targeting agent banks in Nairobi County. A random sampling method and a 
structured questionnaire were applied in sample selection and data collection respectively. 
Descriptive and inferential statistics were used for data analysis. With regard to the first 
objective, the study found that age of the business had a high positive significant relationship 
with split deposits and  a negative one with identity theft. Proximity to bank branches had a 
positive correlation with unauthorised access of agent transactional data and fake ATMs but 
showed a negative relationship with unauthorized customer charges. Unauthorized PIN 
access showed a positive correlation with acting for multiple banks. Location had a 
correlation with registration of customers with fake details and extortion. In terms of the 
second objective, the findings revealed that the risk management practices which are 
effectively adopted in agent banks are Governance and leadership, preventive and detective. 
Monitoring and response practices scored poorly in terms of effectiveness. The third 
objective revealed that preventive, detective and monitoring practices have a statistically 
significant relationship with level of activity. These findings should be of interest to 






CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Risk management has been of importance to practitioners, academics as well as the business 
community mainly because it enhances organizational performance while creating value for 
the business (CGAP, 2015). Risk management is the process of understanding and managing 
risks that an organization may face. The one sector that really feels the need for risk 
management is financial services industry because such businesses take on other people’s 
risks.  In a report by Chironga, Cunha, Grandis, and Kuyoro (2018), cost of risk by African 
banks was second highest in the world. According to Bell and Jhang (2011), some of the key 
benefits of fraud risk assessment are reduction of fraud exposure, supplementing internal 
controls in fight against fraud and assisting towards meeting regulatory requirements. 
Agency banking is a partnership with non-banks, which may range from kiosks, pharmacies, 
consumer goods distributors, and petrol station operators to provide distribution outlets for 
financial services (Kumar & ThorstenBeck, 2006). Agency banking adopts a small business 
structure, which helps to bank the poor and unbanked people, by taking services closer to 
them. According to CBK (2010), an agent is “an entity that has been contracted by an 
institution and approved by the Central Bank of Kenya to provide the services of the 
institution (a bank) on behalf of the institution.” Agents are seen as the bricks and mortar of a 
DFS business. The institution (bank) chooses different ways for smooth management of 
agents. One arrangement is through Agent Network Managers (ANMs) who perform 
functions like selecting, contracting, training and monitoring, managing, and serving as 
liquidity managers. (CBK, 2016). Since their introduction, agent banks have suffered from 
fraud threat (Akelola, 2012; Agalla, 2014; FSD Kenya, 2010; Mundra, 2017). However, it is 
not clear which fraud risk management techniques are effective in curbing fraud in agent 
banks. Albrecht, Albrecht and Albrecht (2006), defines fraud as an act involving intentional 
deceit and attempted concealment to gain an advantage. Laws relating to fraud vary from one 
country to another but there are universal principles on effective fraud risk management. 
These principles are, prevention, governance, detection, response and monitoring (CGMA, 
2012). According to ACFE (2016), organizations lose approximately 5% of their annual 




CGMA (2012) reported that although it is not possible to eliminate all fraud, indicators and 
alerts are best used as fraud occurrence warnings. According to (CGAP, 2015) although 
Kenyan banks are permitted to do inspection of agents, there has been no evidence of specific 
examination procedures.  
CGMA (2012) argues that the two key components of fraud prevention are a sound ethical 
culture and sound internal control systems. Internal controls comprise of all the 
organizational policies and procedures which thrive on an ethical environment. If the 
environment is rotten then the procedures become irrelevant so the two components are 
interrelated.  Fraud detection uncovers fraud while prevention stops fraud from happening. 
The major elements in fraud detection include data mining, trend analysis and ongoing risk 
assessment (Opiyo, 2015). Different researchers have different understanding of fraud risk 
management which have led to varied findings. While some (Kovacs & David, 2016; 
Waigumo,2003; Wanga, 2013) find preventive and detective to be most important others like 
(Action Fraud, 2017 & CGMA, 2012) argue that governance plays the most  critical role in 
fraud management.  
When banks adopt agency banking, they engage in policies and procedures for managing the 
related risks. According to CGAP (2015), banks engage in preventive techniques, training 
and monitoring in accordance with the regulatory requirements. The banks set the content and 
frequency of the training and monitoring. In Kenya, training should be in accordance with the 
bank’s operational manual (CBK, 2016).  Monitoring of agents is done onsite as well as by 
principal banks having a remote transaction monitoring system. This way, it is possible to 
catch fraudulent transactions. Periodic visits should also be done to the agent banks on a 
sampling basis. A branch manager should be in charge of the nearest agent bank and he 
becomes responsible for reporting to the bank (CGAP, 2015). 
Agency banking has become a key factor in developing and emerging economies. According 
to CBK (2016), by the end of 2017, 18 commercial banks had contracted 53,833 agents in 
Kenya and this was an increase from 40,592 recorded in 2015.The number of transactions 
increased by 30.9% from 79,620,211 in 2015 to 104,193,459 by December 2016 as shown in 
table 1.1. According to Atandi (2013), the level of risk to which a bank is exposed to fraud as 
a result of agents’ use depend on extent to which the institution engages them, activities by 
agents and  how the bank manages the agent functions.  
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There is need for not only oversight and monitoring but also key considerations in the process 
of selecting and training the agents (CBK, 2009). As more banks transact via retail agents, 
there is concern about whether there is security relating to customer money (Deloitte, 2013). 
Dias and McKee (2010), proposed that the best measures for reduction of the incidences and 
consequences of fraud is for banks to screen, qualify, and monitor their agents. Another 
report by CGAP (2011), advises that in the absence of regulatory or supervisory 
requirements, a bank should put in place internal policies and procedures. ACFE (2017) 
posits that FRM requires a proactive approach based on the size, structure, nature of 
operations and the environment a business operates in. 
According to CGAP (2015), risks associated with agents can be technological, credit, 
operational, legal and reputational as well as consumer related. Countries take different risk 
management approaches towards risks in agency banking. Oxford Policy Management (2011) 
report showed that whereas Brazil and Mexico have adopted rules to ensure price 
transparency by agents,  in India and Peru such rules are set in general consumer protection 
regulations. Brazilian regulation requires banks to be fully liable for their agents’ while  Peru, 
the Philippines, Mexico, Colombia and India have extensive data privacy regulations and 
require agents be trained with respect to bank secrecy, anti-money laundering, and data 
privacy compliance. Brazil however has little data privacy regulations while Kenya has no 
rules for agents of mobile payments providers such as M-PESA (Dias & McKee, 2010).  
While studies have been done on agency fraud, limited research has been undertaken about 
how agents identify, classify, and manage the risks resulting from customer relations. 
Supervisory resources are a major constraint in many developing countries where agents are 
being used in increasing scale resulting to customers taking advantage. This paper therefore 
sought to provide an early attempt to help agents/ supervisors/regulators implement an 
effective risk-based approach to prevent such fraud. 
Agency banking started in Brazil in 1999 and has since been adopted in other developing 
countries. Bank agents provide a wide range of services like transmitting information, Cash 
handling, Processing information, and Electronic Funds Transfer (CGAP, 2011). Banks are 
now using agents to provide financial services. Countries where agency banking is currently 
flourishing include Brazil, Kenya, Colombia, India, Mexico, Pakistan and Peru (FSD Kenya, 
2010). In the recent past, agents were used mostly by banks in Latin America and some Asian 
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countries, such as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, and by nonbanks in Africa. However, this 
is changing and nonbanks are now entering the Latin American and Asian markets and banks 
are building up on their agent businesses in Africa (CGAP, 2015). 
CBK (2016), indicated there were a total of 42 commercial banks in Kenya under the 
regulation of the Central Bank of Kenya. For the country to achieve its vision 2030 goal of 
financial inclusion, the Banking Act was amended in November 2009, to include provisions 
on financial institutions’ use of agents to provide banking services. Agents may provide cash 
in/ cash out services, engage in bill payments, withdrawals and transfers or provide a wider 
array of services including selling credit and it is upon the principal institution to assess 
suitability of an agent before they are registered as such (CBK, 2010). In the same report the 
total value of agent banking transactions increased from Sh65.0 billion to Sh176.7 billion in 
2016. This was highly attributable to increased confidence and acceptability of the agency 
banking model by banks and the public as well. Agent transactions hit the 1Trillion shillings 
mark in 2015 (Irungu, 2015). According to African Independent (2017), the value increased 
from 4.3 billion dollars in 2015 to over 7 billion dollars in 2017.  In 2015, data from Central 
Bank showed that agents handled Sh99 billion in the three months between September and 
December which translates to more than a billion shillings daily.  This is further explained in 
the following table. 
Table 1.1: Agent banks outreach indicator 
 2014 2015  2016 Cumulative 
(2010-2016) 










Total Agents appointed 35,847 40,592 53,833  
Number of  agency transactions   60 Million 79.9 Million 102 Million 323 Million 
Value of transactions( Kshs) 345.7 Million 442.9 Million 734.3Million 2.13 Trillion 
Source CBK, 2016  
Performance is a subjective measure of how an organization or a firm uses its assets to 
generate income, and also a measure of a firm's overall financial health over a given period of 
time. Performance measurement tools can help identify weaknesses, improve management 
processes and clarify objectives. These measures vary and include use of growth 
opportunities, indebtedness, product innovation, organizational changes, revenue and 
perceived growth. Researchers differ on performance indicators. Olaru, Pirnea, Hohan and 
Maftei (2013), have argued that SMEs with integrated management systems lean more 
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towards financial measures while Matsoso & Benedict (2014) are of the opinion that most 
small businesses use non-financial measures. The balance score card approach by Kaplan and 
Norton requires that management focus on factors which create long term economic value. 
According to a study by Ankrah and Mensah (2015), personal performance and customer 
satisfaction are used as performance measures by small enterprises. Other studies use owner 
expectations, ability to stay in the market and customer growth as measures of success.  Such 
inconsistencies have led to difference in results. 
A 2016 World Bank survey reported access to formal financial services had increased from 
27% of Kenyan bankable population in 2006 to 70% in 2015. AB is regarded to be more 
convenient than visiting a bank branch (CGAP, 2006). This branchless model however 
suffered a major blow from mobile phone companies (Josiah Aduda, 2013). Fraud is seen to 
be one of the major challenges facing agency banking adoption (Helix Institute of Digital 
Finance, 2017). 
According to Deloitte (2013), bank fraud has become sophisticated and is increasing at a rate 
of more than 15% yearly. This is due to lack of oversight, pressure to meet targets, collusion 
amongst employees and with outsiders as well as lack of tools to identify red flags. The 
report cited that most of the fraud is in retail banking. This study therefore sought to analyse 
whether agent banks characteristics are to blame for increased fraud in retail banking. This 
would be possible by establishing whether fraud types are the same across all agent banks.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
According to Action Fraud (2017) as many as two in four small businesses fall victim to 
fraud but agent banks like most SMEs have not been very open about fraud occurrences. This 
is because business owners wish to portray efficiency and effectiveness in running their 
businesses. Laufer (2011) argues that the most effective thing a business owner can do to 
prevent fraud is to lead by example.  
Fraud risk is among the top three risks facing financial institutions in Kenya (Mwithi, 2015). 
When compared to other countries in East Africa, the Kenyan banking sector ranks highest in 
fraud (Kiragu, Wanjau, Gekara, & Kanali, 2013). Because of their responsibility in financial 
intermediation, banks play a major role and occupy a unique position within the Kenyan 
economy (CBK, 2010). Although most of the banks comply with risk management 
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guidelines, there are still concerns with fraud risk (CBK, 2015). Adoption of agency banking 
has played a major role towards financial inclusion albeit with challenges. According to Helix 
Institute of Digital Finance (2017), the challenges facing agency banking are fraud risk, client 
uptake, liquidity and lack of training.   
Risk assessment studies have been inconsistent due to geographical location, timing and 
methodologies adopted. Studies in developed countries differ with those in developing 
because the countries are at different risk management stages. According to Ajibo (2015) in 
Nigeria for example, risk management is still in its very early stages. In a report by (Sayar & 
Wolfe, 2007) risk management approaches in Turkey are technological while those by British 
banks are more conventional. Such differences are attributed to contrasting banking cultures 
and technological appetite between countries. Timing bears different results in that recent 
studies adopt more comprehensive approaches when compared to earlier ones. This is 
because fraud has become complex overtime (KPMG Forensic, 2014). Supervision and 
regulation have not been sufficient in dealing with fraud related challenges in agent banks 
due to lack of participation by policymakers, financial institutions and consumer society 
groups (Dias & McKee, 2010). Because of such differences in findings, there has not been 
conclusive research on FRM practices in agency banking. According to Deloitte (2013) most 
fraud in banks is discovered through complaints by customers, internal whistleblowers and 
during reconcilliation of accounts. In agent banks where conventional book keeping rarely  
happens, fraud might be discovered  by tracing it to certain  organizational characteristics.    
With a clear understanding of the fraud types to look out for, effective techniques and their 
effect on activity level, providers would be able to deal with fraud and prevent huge losses 
which are accountable to fraud. Fraud losses are usually transferred as increased costs to the 
customers. If this happens, the model fails in the primary reason it was intended for of 
banking the poor. The losses could lead to closure of the facilities which play a huge role in 
financial inclusion. While previous studies focused on fraud risk practices and others on 






1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1 General Objective  
The main objective of this study was to investigate the effect of fraud risk management 
practices on activity levels by agent banks in Nairobi County.  
1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
The study sought to address the following objectives: 
1. To establish whether there exists any association between fraud types and the 
characteristics of agent banks in Nairobi County. 
2. To establish the fraud risk management practices adopted to address fraud related 
challenges in agent banks in Nairobi County. 
3. To analyse the association between fraud risk management practices and activity 
levels by agent banks in Nairobi County. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The study sought to answer the following questions: 
1. Is there an association between agency fraud types and the characteristics of agent 
banks in Nairobi County? 
2. Which fraud risk management practices are adopted to address fraud related 
challenges in agent banks in Nairobi County? 
3. What is the association between fraud risk management practices and activity levels 
by agent banks in Nairobi County? 
1.5 Scope of the Study  
The study was conducted in Nairobi County with the population focus being 150 agent banks 




1.6 Significance of the Study  
The findings of this study are significant to the following;- 
1.6.1 Regulators and Bank managers 
The main purpose for introducing the agency banking model was to have more people access 
banking services. Adoption of the model has however suffered setbacks like fraud among 
others. This study adds value to the policy makers/regulators in addressing issues related to 
fraud in agency banking with regards to financial institutions. Agent banks performance 
affect the overall success of the bank and data from this study is relevant to bank managers 
who are answerable to the regulator.  
1.6.2 Agent banks and affiliate banks 
Since fraud is a major factor that affects agency banking and the institutions which they act 
on behalf of, this study helps agent banks and principal commercial banks to formulate 
appropriate mechanisms to identify and overcome fraud related challenges; as well as inform 
them on the constraints they may face. The study helped identify which of the measures 
already in place are effective or not and to what extent.  
1.6.3 Academic researchers 
This study also contributes to the existing literature in the field of fraud awareness, 
prevention and response in the implementation of agency banking.  It is hoped that this forms 




CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of related works on fraud risk management and banking 
performance by other researchers, academicians, and authors. The review considers agency 
theory, fraud triangle/diamond theory and the fraud management life cycle theory. The 
chapter also includes a conceptual framework showing relationship between the variables 
under study.   
Most fraud takes a median period of between 18 and 36 months before detection. Most 
organizations do not recover the losses amounting from fraud as only 12% recover fully 
(ACFE, 2016). Organizations and businesses which have anti-fraud controls in place report 
lower losses when compared to those that do not have such controls. FRM has been on the 
rise mainly because of increase in scrutiny by governments and regulators. Preventive and 
detective techniques play a huge role in fraud risk management. Fraud detection focuses on 
alerts while prevention stops the actual act from occurring.  Fraud risk management is a 
continuous process as organizations are disposed to different risks every day. An organization 
should analyze its position and its goals with regards to preventing, detecting and response to 
fraud. For successful fight against fraud, financial institutions must understand where their 
vulnerabilities lie. With organizations losing five percent of their revenues to fraud, fraud risk 
management becomes of importance in enhancing performance. Periodic reviews of agent 
networks in all aspects including financial and operational help a lot to identify new and 
growing weaknesses. 
2.2 Theories on Fraud Risk Management and agency banking. 
Risk management in agency banking has been discussed by different researchers using 
theories like agency theory, fraud triangle and diamond theory, bank led theory, non-bank led 
theory, financial intermediation theory and fraud management lifecycle theory( (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976, Albrecht, Albrecht, & Albrecht, 2006; Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007; Wesley, 
2004). The theories which this study adopted are agency, fraud triangle, diamond, pentagon 




2.2.1 Agency theory 
The agent/principal issue had been pondered from as early as the 18
th
 century by Adam 
Smith, when he warned against managers handling money that is not theirs. The agency 
theory however emerged in the early 1970’s. Agency relationship is when a person/entity is 
engaged by another/principal to perform services on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory studies the agency relationship and the issues arising there from. Agency 
problem mainly arises because the principal and agent may not always share the same 
interests. Agency problem can be principal problem, agent problem and policing 
mechanisms. The principal’s problem is to ensure the agent is motivated enough in order for 
them to work towards their (principal’s) goal. Agent problem on the other hand involves the 
agent having to balance between acting in the principal’s or own interests. Policing 
mechanisms are intended to limit the agents’ discretion. Agency problems bear agency costs 
(Mudiri, 2017). Agency costs arise when there is need to monitor the agent. Agency costs 
affect overall performance of the agent bank as well as the principal bank. This means the 
agency theory and more so the agency cost has a direct relationship with the firm’s success. 
When commercial banks adopt the agency banking model, this becomes a principal agent 
relationship. This relationship has benefits and risks in equal measures Mungai (2016), and 
fraud is one such risk. The two parties in this agency relationship must work together to 
reduce fraud occurrences and losses. The financial and non-financial loss that a business 
suffers due to fraud is an agency cost which must be minimized by applying the most 
effective fraud risk management technique. Agency theory informs this study by explaining 
the agency relationship, the fraud challenges therein and how this impacts the activity levels 
in agent banks. 
2.2.2 Fraud Triangle, Diamond and Pentagon theories. 
In 1950, a criminologist, Donald Cressey started a study into why people commit fraud. After 
interviewing 250 criminals, he concluded that fraudsters exhibit three fraud triggers traits. 
These three are pressure/motive to violate trust, opportunity to commit the violation and 
rationalization. Cressey’s hypothesis is known as the ‘fraud triangle’. Albrecht et al (2006) 
mentioned that the motives for fraud can be financial or non-financial. Over time a fourth 
element was added to the fraud triangle making it the fraud diamond. This fourth element is 
capability to conceal fraud (Jonas & Lukas, 2013). It is argued that a person must have the 
ability to recognize an opportunity and take advantage of it, not once but many times over 
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(T.Wolfe & R.Hermanson, 2004). A recent theory that explores deeply on fraud triggers is 
the Fraud pentagon theory by Crowe Howarth in 2011. The additional element on FPT which 
was not in the FTT was competence. Competence has similar meaning with capability as 
described in the FDT. According to Sorunke (2016), arrogance as the fifth element is 
described as a feeling where one doesn’t respect organization’s internal controls due to 
superiority attitude.  This is illustrated in figure 2.1 








               




According to Abdullahi, Mansor and Nuhu (2015) fraud levels and costs that are concealed 
increase with time. It is upon the anti-graft bodies to understand what leads to fraud in order 
to seal the loopholes. However as much as a lot is expected to prevent and detect fraud, 
detection requires knowledge about fraud nature, mode of operation as well as how it is 
concealed (Kassem & Higson, 2012). Prevention is important since by the time fraud is 
detected, an entity have suffered financial loss and damage. To reduce fraud opportunities, 
the COSO internal control framework provides a foundation for prevention and detection. 
This framework consists of control environment, risk assessment, control activities, 
Opportunity 












information and communication and monitoring. Opportunity to commit fraud is blamed on 
poor organizational structures, and internal controls. 
Agency banking fraud is due to opportunities in weak supervision, weak controls and poor 
segregation of duties (Akelola, 2012). These opportunities are in interaction with other fraud 
elements. If one element is removed from the equation, it is unlikely that fraud will happen. 
Based on this theory it is evident that fraud is not a random act but rather a well calculated 
move. In an agent and principal bank relationship, management should take steps to reduce 
pressure on the agents even though not all pressures can be eliminated. This makes 
opportunity which is a key element in the fraud triangle one where management has 
maximum control in (Auditor of Public Accounts, 2011). Kelly and A.Hartley (2010) are of 
the opinion that people are likely to take advantage of opportunities which are at their 
disposal. Opportunity is seen as the oxygen that keeps the fraud fire burning so it is upon the 
banks to control that and reduce fraud occurrence by adopting effective risk management 
practices. In the Kroll Advisory Solutions (2013) report, fraud in the financial sector industry 
is at a high prevalence rate while the degree of investing in fraud countermeasures is 
moderate. From understanding of these fraud theories, opportunities to commit fraud should 
be minimized if not eliminated. This requires application of risk management practices. The 
three theories were applied in analyzing characteristics that lead to fraud and looking at ways 
in which they can be eliminated.  
2.2.3 Fraud management life cycle theory 
Wesley’s Fraud Management Life cycle has eight stages namely, deterrence, prevention, 
detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation and prosecution. Wesley (2004) is of the 
opinion that these stages do not have to occur in any sequential or linear flow like in the fraud 
triangle theory. Deterrence stage is characterized by actions to inhibit fraud before further 
attempts are carried out. Prevention involves keeping the entity’s processes and systems 
secure and safe from fraud. Detection is where methods are used to identify and locate fraud 
before, during and after completion of the fraud activity (KPMG Forensic, 2014). Detection 
aims to uncover presence of fraud. Mitigation focuses on stopping losses from occurring. 
During analysis stage, the losses which have occurred despite the previous stages are studied. 
Policy stage is characterized by creation, evaluation, communication and adoption of policies 
to reduce fraud. Investigation stage is where evidence is gathered to stop fraud from 
continuing to happen. The final stage is prosecution where failures and successes in fraud 
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management cycle come to be appreciated. Failures mean fraud has happened while 
successes mean that fraud is detected, the suspect(s) identified, apprehended, and necessary 
charges filed. The processes are as indicated in figure 2.2 
 
Figure 2.2 Fraud management life cycle 
In the fight against agency banking fraud, all these stages need to be integrated and balanced. 
In a Deloitte (2013) report, bank fraud was the third highest, the first two being insurance and 
telecommunications sectors respectively. The processes under Fraud management life cycle 
theory are evaluated to establish their relationship with levels of activity in agent banks. 
2.3 Empirical review of literature 
Following is a review of literature that has been done on fraud risk management, level of 
activity and characteristics of agent banks. The focus is on the banking sector and SMEs 
because agent banks adopt small and medium business structures. 
2.3.1 Fraud risk management and activity levels by banks 
Fraud risk management studies in banks have taken different approaches. Some researchers 
have looked at developing tools to manage risks (Bell & Jhang, 2011; Wright, 2007; Kovacs 
& David, 2016; Prabowo, 2012; J.F.Bishop, 2004) while others focused at how FRM impacts 
activity levels in commercial banks (O.L.Hoffmann & Birnbrich, 2012; Shen & Hartarska, 
2013). Others evaluated the extent to which banks use risk management practices (Khalid & 
Amjad, 2012; Dedman & Robert-Tissot, 2008; Sharifi, Haldar, & Rao, 2016; Button et al 
2015).  Pearce (2011) held that governments, regulators and financial infrastructure should 
work towards achievement of financial inclusion by managing the risks which act as 
















Source: Adapted from Wesley, 2004 
14 
 
receiving fraud allegations, investigative procedures, punishing and remediating procedures. 
Figure 2.3 is a representation of the main aspects of a FRM framework. 
Figure 2.3 Fraud risk management framework 
 
Source: COSO, 2013 
There is a positive relationship between FRM and activity levels (Ohando, 2014; Mutuku, 
2016; Agalla, 2014; Waigumo, 2003). Preventive and detective FRM have strong positive 
impact on level of activities of commercial banks.  Preventive measures adopted by banks 
include and not limited to strong controls, management oversight, antifraud policies, and 
surprise audits. The detective practices are internal audits and bank reconciliations while 
response mechanisms are recovery of stolen assets and strengthening of internal controls. 
This means that for banks to control fraud, they should adopt preventive and detective 
mechanisms. Mutuku (2016) found that budgets should be put in place to cater for the ever 
changing risk environment. In a similar study by Mutua (2014) on the effect of credit risk 
management by commercial banks in Kenya, the importance of having mechanisms against 
risk is reiterated. The study however concluded that credit risk identification had less impact 
on activity levels while non-performing loans were found to have a very huge negative 
Creation of a control 
environment.(e.g Tone at 
the top, ethics and 
integrity) 
Fraud risk assessment 
(identification, likelihood 
and potential cost of 
risks) 
Anti fraud  
prevention/control 
activities 
Fraud Detection( whistle 




impact. Commercial banks are advised to adopt different financing methods to help cut costs, 
improve business processes and customer relations.  
Previous studies show that there exist a relationship between fraud risk management and 
activity levels (Muteti, 2014; Waigumo,2003; Wanga, 2013; Kiragu et al, 2013). Muteti 
(2014) found there was a negative relationship between; interest risk, foreign exchange risk, 
liquidity risk, credit risk and activity levels of banks while Waigumo (2003) found a positive 
relationship. According to Muteti (2014) banks should control their credit risk through non-
performing loans, and hedge against foreign exchange and interest risks.  His study also 
showed a positive relationship between capital management, bank size and deposits. This 
variance in results was attributed to methodologies adopted. Waigumo (2003) coded data into 
SPSS software, where descriptive and statistical frequencies were used and she concluded 
that unapproved loans increased fraud levels while credit cards, computer fraud and account 
opening manifested high to very high fraud levels. On the other hand counterfeit money, 
account opening and money transfers led to little occurrence of fraud. (Wanga, 2013), found 
that the highest fraud risk facing banks was identity theft. These studies agreed there is need 
for information sharing on fraud issues and that banks should approach fraud issues as a 
sector as opposed to individual banks.  This is because there are times when banks suffer 
fraud from same fraudsters due to lack of information sharing.   
Studies show that banks adopt different practices in the fight against fraud. According to 
Wanga (2013) banks largely use preventive strategies and whistle blowing from within and 
without the business. The study recommended reforms in the police and judiciary so as to 
deal with fraud issues in the banking sector. Waigumo (2003) and Muteti (2014) agreed that 
as much as Kenyan banks adopt preventive and detective mechanisms to curb fraud, there is 
still very high occurrences of real time gross settlement fraud. Mungai (2016),  enhanced the 
importance of training and monitoring and recommended the need for agent banks 
supervisors to be specifically trained in managerial and financial competencies which they in 
turn would transfer to agents. Ogola, K'Aol and Linge (2016) were of the opinion that tone at 
the top was negatively correlated with amount and frequency of fraud. Control systems set by 
the CBK lowers fraud levels to significant levels and strategies to fight fraud risk yielded 
higher fraud loss rates (Abolo, 2017). Ogola et al (2016) and Muteti (2014) recommended 
frequent tests for all banks’ employees as well as creation of fraud specific reports. This is in 
agreement with other studies on high need for adoption of anti-fraud measures. 
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In Nigeria where fraud risk management is in its early stages, banks are encouraged to 
develop effective risk management structures. The Nigerian Banking regulation future lies in 
a risk based framework (Ajibo, 2015). Thus, the Nigerian Credit rating should not be a 
substitute for oversight functions and due diligence exercises. The central Bank of Nigeria 
should also provide a credit risk management bureau to serve as a medium for mitigation. It 
is recommended by Achugamonu (2017) that licensing more agents and having user friendly 
products would go a long way in ensuring that the government agenda of banking the poor in 
Nigeria is achieved. Levels of illiteracy among the unbanked, poor geographical spread of 
AB and lack of awareness are the major setbacks towards financial inclusion. 
2.3.2 Fraud and activity levels in agent banks 
Alexandra (2011) argued that as much as agency banking is important for the developing 
countries towards financial inclusion, a lot of awareness need to be done about the model and 
governments in collaboration with regulators should give maximum support for the model to 
succeed. Similarly, Agalla (2014) recommended that regulator monitoring of agent banks and 
agent documents is critical. Updated technology is seen as the link between banks and their 
agents so there is need to invest in updated and efficient technology. These two studies 
focused on challenges facing implementation of agency banking and it was established the 
major factors are poor training, poor resource allocation and outdated technological 
instruments. The study design was both descriptive and explanatory using questionnaires and 
the Microsoft Excel tools to analyze.  
Kiragu et al (2013) studied 10 commercial banks in Kenya that had adopted agency banking, 
to evaluate the relationship that AB had with activity levels of commercial banks in Kenya. 
Like the previous studies, he concluded that agent training and improved technology makes a 
huge difference towards success of the model. Financial reports by mainstream banks and the 
CBKs annual reports were analyzed and it was found that there is a positive correlation 
between activity levels by agents with volume of money by affiliate banks. This agreed with 
CBK (2016), that AB is a huge contributing factor towards the overall performance of 
mainstream banks because it reduces costs of setting up and hiring personnel. It should 
however be noted that for the agent banks to be successful, the principal banks should 
cushion them against some costs like set up, transit related and insurance costs.  
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Akelola (2012) used the fraud triangle in her research to predict fraud patterns but it was not 
found to be effective given the nature of the Kenyan fraudsters. Weak industry cooperation, 
poor policing infrastructure, ineffective justice system, weak regulatory framework and lack 
of fraud budgets were identified. The research agreed with other studies that fraud is a major 
issue in the Kenyan banking industry, but disagreed that the size of fraud was huge and 
sophisticated. This contradicted other similar studies, and therefore there is need for different 
approaches like theoretical and conceptual as opposed to just environmental factors for more 
conclusiveness.  
Mungai (2016) did an assessment of factors that determine performance of agent banks in 
Kenya. Stratified sampling and questionnaires were used, and data was analyzed using 
descriptive and inferential statistics. Among all the respondents, the only reason and threat 
that would make them leave the lucrative venture was robbery and theft. The major expenses 
were costs of acquiring transaction devices, rent and electricity. The study also found that 
agent banking helped increase the number of customers frequenting stores which transacted 
other businesses together with the agency banking transactions. Agents’ performance was 
highly dependent on ability of the owner to borrow funds, their ability to manage business 
finance as well as their ability to manage the core business. Since the model is highly 
dependent on network coverage and security of the environment there is need to ensure these 
two factors are enhanced. 
A survey by CBK in 2015 indicated that agent banks reported 1,297 fraud cases of which 
most involved counterfeit notes and robbery. According to a study by FSD Kenya, the fraud 
types among agent banks were as illustrated in figure 2.4. 
Chart 2.4 Percentages of fraud by Agent Banks. 
 












2.3.3 Activity levels and business characteristics  
Performance is an area that has been understood differently by researchers.  While they agree 
that activity levels quantify the efficiency and effectiveness of an organization, they differ on 
the control factors that determine the optimal performance. Performance measurement is 
diverse as authors suggest different guidelines, frameworks, models, processes, principles and 
techniques (Sergio, Elaine, Paulo, & Guimareraes, 2007). 
Agent banks operate as small businesses and in Xiang  and Worthington (2007) an SME is 
affected by the business size, level of innovation, the industry it is operating in and the 
business objectives. Agent banks operate in an industry where fraud is prevalent and 
therefore fraud risk management is important (African Independent, 2017). Karadag (2017) 
found that owner/ manager level of education as well as the age of the business have a 
positive relationship with activity levels but shows there is no significance when it came 
to the difference of industries. Hema, Gunapala and Anula (2008) concluded that there is a 
strong relationship between manager/ owner mentality and activity levels in small businesses. 
This relationship however becomes less significant as the business matures. In other similar 
studies Jaana and Mervi (2012) found that ownership structure has an impact on activity 
levels of small businesses while board structure has little impact. This could be interpreted to 
mean that the owners are risk averse. Most SMEs revolve around owner-managers so their 
individual characteristics may affect activity levels. Desiree (2016) found that businesses 
which are owned/ managed by both genders tend to perform better when compared to 
those by men only. According to Bahri, St-Pierre and Sakka (2017) relying on particular 
measures may result to contradictory information. This is because some practices are 
significant in some specific areas of a business but in terms of overall performance they 
may not be.  
Agent banks operate as small enterprises which are mostly owner managed while being 
supervised by the principal banks. Activity levels in agent banks like in other similar 
businesses would be measured in terms of perceived growth (customer flow and deposits), 
indebtedness and revenue growth. Managing risks results to stakeholder confidence and 
employee morale which positively impact the overall success (Bell & Jhang, 2011). If fraud 
is not controlled, the costs are transferred to the customers and this affects the business which 
may lead to closure. 
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2.4 Research Gaps 
From the reviewed literature the key fraud enablers in agency banking include and not limited 
to weak regulation, age of the agent banks, processes, compliance monitoring, cultural issues 
and seasons. Fraud in the banking sector is a very sensitive matter because banks need to 
protect their reputation as well as maintain customer confidence (ACFE, 2006). Atandi 
(2013) feels that agent banks operators/owners are also very protective in matters fraud 
because they want to be perceived as being effective and efficient. Most of the study done on 
agency banking is on adoption of the model and the challenges there in as well as their 
contribution towards the principal institutions profitability.  Agent banks play a major role 
towards financial inclusion but fraud threat is a huge hindrance (Akelola, 2012 ;Alexandra, 
2011). Little research has been done on fraud and risk management in agent banks, and their 
impact. This study linked FRM to activity levels. The study sought to fill this social and 
research gap by adding to existing literature, and establishing whether the prescribed FRM 
framework is effective in agent banks and if there is need for improvement. 
2.5 Summary of the Literature 
This chapter presented three theories underpinning the study as well as the empirical 
literature in fraud risk management and performance measures. Agency theory, fraud 
triangle/diamond and fraud risk management lifecycle was used to show the relationship 
between the variables. The fraud and agency theories helped inform on the specific 
characteristics which motivate /lead to fraud. The fraud management lifecycle theory gives a 
sequence of measures that should be applied in fighting fraud. The interaction of the three 
theories gave a more comprehensive insight in this research.  
The literature review revealed that AB is important towards financial inclusion (African 
Independent, 2017). Agent banks reduce costs on banks as they do not need to inject capital 
into setting up branches and hiring workforce. Fraud has been cited as one of the major 
hindrances towards agency banking success. Performance measures vary across businesses 
and industries and so there is no one suit for all.  Little has been done on fraud types and 
management practices being by banks to solve fraud menace as well as how they are linked to 
activity levels. It is for this purpose that this study investigated the effect of fraud risk 
management on level of activity by agent banks. 
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2.6 Conceptual Framework  
A conceptual framework identifies the variables that a researcher requires in their study 
(Kothari, 2004). It categorizes and describes concepts that are necessary to a study and map 
the relationships among those concepts. For this study three types of variables have been 
used. The dependent variable is agent banks activity levels while independent variable is 
FRM practices. There are also two intervening variables which are agent bank characteristics 
and fraud types. The conceptual framework herein links FRM to activity levels by looking at 
the fraud types and fraud risk practices that would influence the level of activity in agent 
















Figure 2.5 Conceptual framework 
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2.6.1 Operationalization of the variables 
2.6.1.1 Agent banks characteristics  
Existing data indicate that there could be some relationship between agent bank 
characteristics and types of fraud (Mungai, 2016). For example the physical location of an 
agent bank could predispose it to certain type of fraud risk. An agent bank that opens very 
early and closes late, faces more risk compared to the one that opens when the surrounding 
businesses have opened. Most agent banks engage in other businesses other than the AB 
transactions attracting many walk- ins and hence increase the risk of fraud occurrences. 
Agent bank characteristics is a control variable because it has an effect on the dependent 
variable and by extension on the independent variable. 
2.6.1.2 Agency fraud types 
The types of fraud may differ among agent banks and this study sought to establish whether 
and how the bank characteristics are associated with certain fraud types. In previous studies 
on challenges facing agent banks the prevalent types of fraud are measured in frequency 
levels (Alexandra, 2011; FSD Kenya, 2010;Helix Institute of Digital Finance, 2017). This 
similar approach was adopted in this research. Fraud types have an effect on  groth and 
success of agent banks and also on the fraud risk techniques that are adopted, thus this 
becomes a control variable. 
2.6.1.3 Fraud risk management techniques 
No previous study has focused on association between fraud risk management and activity 
levels in agent banks. In this study the FRM techniques was measured by looking at how 
strong or weak they are. For instance if governance is not working then probably the overall 
fraud risk management framework doesn’t either.  Preventive practices were measured in 
terms of training and how businesses follow the code of conduct, communication and due 
diligence (CGMA, 2012). Detective measures looked at whistleblowing, monitoring and 
frequency of surprise audits by ANMs. Response was evaluated by whether the agent banks 
take remedial actions after fraud is detected as prescribed in (J.F.Bishop, 2004).  
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2.6.1.4 Activity levels of agent banks 
Activity level was measured by the number of transactions which in turn impacts revenue. 
There are three scenarios that can describe success in a business. A firm can be profitable; it 
can break even or make a loss (Kiragu, Wanjau, Gekara, & Kanali, 2013). The aim of most 
businesses is to make a profit thus creating value for the owner. In Kenya no previous study 
has been done on fraud risk management and activity levels in agent banks as most have 
focused on commercial banks. In those studies, activity levels were measured by transactions 
and growth in customers (Ankrah & Mensah, 2015; Akelola, 2012). In agent banks which 
adopt a small business model, common performance measures are perceived growth, revenue 
and customer growth. As an agent serves more transactions, there is revenue increase in terms 






CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology for collecting and analyzing data to be able 
to test the objectives of the study. The chapter also gives the scope of research design and 
procedure, the target population, sampling techniques and overall frame work of the study. 
The relationship between the variables was explored using correlation, frequency measures 
and regression methods. 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
Saunders et al (2009) defines a research philosophy as a term relating to the development and 
nature of knowledge. In research one makes assumptions about human knowledge, reality 
and based on values and ethics (Kothari, 2004). A well thought out philosophy underpins the 
methodology, research strategy as well as data collection techniques and analysis procedures. 
A positivistic philosophy deals with units that can be observed and tested. This study was 
based on the positivist approach which implies that the researcher is working with an 
observable social reality (Saunders et al, 2009). This philosophy assumes the researcher is 
looking for relationships or correlations between variables using structured questionnaires 
and official statistics for reliability and representativeness (S.Kuhn, 2004). 
3.2 Research Design  
According to Kothari (2004), a research design is the plan and a road map towards answering 
questions in the study.  Research can be quantitative, qualitative or a mixture of the two 
methods (Creswell, 2008; Cohen et al., 2007; Gliner et al., 2009; Kothari, 2004). This study 
adopted both descriptive and explanatory designs that investigated the effect of fraud risk 
management practices on AB activity levels. This design was preferred as it objectively 
describes characteristics and functions as opposed to thoughts and ideas. A descriptive design 
suited this study as it follows a structured research process and a preplanned statistical 
design.  The motive of the study was to analyze and describe fraud aspects in agency banking 
and being a qualitative study, it was best to rely on descriptive narrative for data analysis as 
indicated in (Gunnell, 2016). A descriptive research design describes aspects of a 
phenomenon or a sample population (Alexandra, 2011;Atandi, 2013). Explanatory design 
was adopted because the conceptual framework is highly causal. The data then produced 
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conclusions which form basis of another research. Fraud has been identified as one of the 
major challenges inhibiting success of agency banking, but not much has been done on fraud 
risk management and activity levels in agent banks. This study therefore sought to investigate 
and describe the association between the variables.  
3.3 Population  
According to Kothari (2004), a population means all items in a field under inquiry. The target 
population in this study was the approved agent banks within Nairobi County. Nairobi 
records the highest number of agent banks in Kenya. According to CBK, 2017 there were a 
total of 2,256 agent banks in Nairobi. The population included agent bank owners and 
employees where the owners are not engaged in day to day running of the business. 
3.4 Sampling Frame  
Cooper et al, (2003) as cited in Wanga (2013) states that the basic idea about sampling is to 
select some elements in a population, from which a conclusion is drawn. A sampling frame is 
a source list from which a sample is drawn. Kothari (2004) argues that a sampling frame 
should be appropriate, correct and comprehensive. The sampling unit in this study was 
Nairobi County, and the sampling frame was agent banks in Nairobi County.  The agent 
banks were selected randomly thus provided a mix in terms of culture, location as well as 
educational levels and therefore varied views and responses.  
3.5 Sample and Sampling Technique 
Different guidelines are proposed on selecting the right sample sizes. Creswell (2008) and 
Goes (2012) advocate for sample sizes of 20- 30 participants. Kothari (2004) argues that data 
saturation may happen when  the researcher feels additional participants are represented in 
the  existing categories and themes. The sample size in this study was 150 respondents since  
higher number of answers would be a true reflection of the population but avoiding 
saturation. A sample design is the technique or plan that a researcher uses to obtain a sample, 
given a population. This involves selection of items from a population. The sample design 
should be appropriate and reliable (Kothari, 2004). For this study, simple random sampling 
was used.  
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3.6 Data Collection Instrument and procedures 
According to Walliman (2011) primary data is distinguished based on measurement, 
observation, interrogation and participation. For this study, questionnaires were used for 
primary data collection. Questionnaires provide advantages in time, cost, standardization and 
ease of use by respondents. The questionnaires contained both open and close ended 
questions. Close ended questions reduces bias of respondent disregarding some questions and 
limiting number of answers to exactly what is relevant for the study. Open ended questions 
aided in getting in depth understanding and explanation. Secondary data was used to make 
assessment by reviewing the previously presented evidence. The use of data from different 
sources helped identify biases and inaccuracies as well as different interpretations that have 
been previously made. This research mainly relied on primary data which is an immediate 
recording of the situation and that which has been observed close to the event (Walliman, 
2011).  
3.7 Data Processing and Analysis 
Data analysis is an ongoing process starting with the first piece of data collected to data 
management, deduction and coding (Creswell, 2008). The aim is to identify patterns and links 
in and between the variables. Data was checked for accuracy and completeness, edited, 
compiled and then analyzed using SPSS and Excel software.  
Inferential statistics were used; Spearman’s Correlation analysis was used to establish 
relationship between the intervening and independent variables.  Ordinal logistic regression 
was used after the assumptions of the model were passed. The assumptions of ordinal logistic 
model are dependent variable should be measured in ordinal scale and one or more of the 
independent variables should be categorical (Hilbe, 2009; Long, 2012). Kruskal-Wallis test 
and Pairwise comparison tests were done to analyze the fraud risk management practices, 
thus picking the most effective. Descriptive statistics was used to describe the sample. Mean, 
mode, frequencies and standard deviation were applied. Tables and graphs were used to 





Since the data was categorical, ordinal logistic regression was used to assess the relationship 
between variables. The independent variable was the fraud risk management practices (X), 
while the dependent variable(Y) was the activity levels by agent banks. The intervening 
variables were the fraud types and agent banks characteristics.  
𝐴𝐵_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖 = 𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝐵_𝐹𝑅𝑀𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐴𝐵_𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐵_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
  Where;      AB_PEFR = Agent banks activity levels. 
                               ɛ = Error term 
                              𝜶 = Intercept   
                       𝜷1, 𝜷2, 𝜷3 = Regression coefficients  
                       AB_FRM = Agent banks fraud risk management practices, 
         AB_FRAUDTYPE = Agent banks fraud types, 
  AB_CHARACT = Agent banks characteristics. 
The model was used to demonstrate if there is relationship between independent and 
dependent variable, if the independent variables are correlated to each other, correlation 
between the intervening variables and lastly, the direct effect of the independent variable on 
the dependent variable. 
Model Fitting Information and Goodness of fit were done to test the model. Pseudo R-square 
(multiple correlation coefficient of determination) was used to determine how much variance 
in the dependent variable could be accounted for by the independent variable and intervening 
variables. The t test was used to determine the significance of each predictor and beta 
coefficients was used to determine the magnitude of prediction for independent and 
intervening variable.  
3.8 Research Quality 
To ensure internal validity, pilot data collection was done before issuing the questionnaire to 
respondents. This resulted to editing the questionnaire to suit the research objectives. 
Objectivity was enhanced by ensuring there is no bias in data analysis, interpretation or in 




3.9 Ethical considerations 
Kothari (2004) argues that ethical considerations are of utmost importance, particularly when 
research involves people. According to Saunders (2009), research ethics is the appropriate 
behaviour of research relative to societal norms. In this study, participation of respondents 
was voluntary and information was not shared or used for any other purposes but the intended 




CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research findings. Data from questionnaires was collected from 
agent banks’ owners and employees. Presentation of data is organized in order of the specific 
objectives. Results on other necessary information are also presented.  
4.2. Sample representation 
A representative sample should reflect the population from which it is drawn (Cherry, 2017). 
The population in this study was quite big and given the time frame and resources, it was not 
possible to study every member. Random sampling was therefore used which gave every 
member of the population a chance of being selected. Different guidelines provide sufficient 
sample sizes for qualitative studies and authors have varied suggestions on sample sizes. 
While Morse (1994) suggests 30–50, Creswell (1998) argues that 20–30 is a valid sample 
size. Qualitative sample size is best determined by the time allotted, resources available, and 
study objectives (Kothari, 2004). This justifies the sample size of 150 based on the population 
in this study. 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
Results from the questionnaires recorded females at 50.4% N=60 while 49.6 % N=59 were 
male. This means that there is equal gender distribution in the sector. The agent banks which 
were studied recorded varied results in terms of years of operation with 17.6% N=21 (over 7 
years), 31.1%N=37(5 to 7 years), 33.6% N (3 to5years) and the rest 17.7% N=21(<3 years).  
48%N=58 were stand -alone businesses while 51.3%N=61 were operating other businesses 
alongside the agent banks. The respondents who had other businesses meant to use that as a 
means to increase the flow of customers into their premises. Almost all the agent banks were 
sole proprietors at 91.6%N=109, compared to only 8.4%N=10 which were partnerships. In 
terms of level of education, the results showed that 95.8% N=114 were O-Level graduates 
and only 4.2% N=5 were undergraduates. This means that the employees and agent banks’ 
owners had basic knowledge which is important in running the business. These findings show 
the respondents possessed knowledge to easily understand and fill in the questionnaire. In 
table 4.3 the summary statistics on data variables analysed are presented. The median ranges 
of 2-5 are measures effectiveness where 1 was most effective and 5 least effective. Skewness 
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shows that the data is not normally distributed as it is not zero or unimodal. This is further 
confirmed by kurtosis which is not zero as would be in a normally distributed data. The data 
was platykurtic distributions since the kurtosis are mostly negatives. 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics 
MEDIAN Governance Preventive Response Detective  Monitoring 
Mean 2.35 3.20 3.86 4.11 3.00 
Median 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 
Variance 1.630 1.799 1.429 1.433 2.000 
Std. Deviation 1.277 1.341 1.195 1.197 1.414 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 2 
Maximum 5 5 5 5 4 
Range 4 4 4 4 2 
Interquartile 
Range 
2 2 2 2   




  119 
-1.090 
  119 
-.693 
  119 
.547 




4.3.1 Level of activity in agent banks 
Summary on questionnaire recorded the highest number of weekly transactions by agents was 
in the range of 51 to 100 at 40.3% N=48.  This was followed by between 100 and 500 
transactions at 31.9 % N=38 and over 500 at 15.1% N=18. Only 15 of the respondents served 
less than 50 transactions in a week.  86.5% N=103 and 89.1% N=106 of the respondents felt 
that fraud risk identification and investigative procedures respectively affected the number 
transactions they served. 84% N=100 and 74.8% N=89 people felt that agent bank location 










4.4. Diagnostic tests 
This section entails the diagnostic tests that were carried out before regression analysis. This 
was done to test the appropriateness of the model. 
Table 4.4: Model Summary 
Model 
    
Durbin-Watson 
 1.854 
  Regressors Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant)     
Counterfeit money .818 1.223 
Fake SMS .825 1.213 
Debit card skimming .840 1.190 
Identity theft .823 1.215 
Fake ATMs .890 1.124 
Split deposits/withdrawals .856 1.169 
Unauthorized PIN access .884 1.131 
Extortion .815 1.226 
Imposing unauthorized customer charges. .798 1.252 
Registration of customers with fake 
details. 
.908 1.102 
Unauthorized access of agent 
transactional data 
.827 1.210 
Customer collude with employee to 
defraud agent 
.915 1.093 
Number of years in operation  .817 1.224 
Is it a stand-alone agent or it engages in 
other businesses? 
.832 1.203 
Ownership of the business. .853 1.172 
Governance .715 1.399 
Preventive  .821 1.217 
Response  .838 1.193 
Detective  .782 1.279 
Monitoring  .752 1.330 
 R
2
 No. of observations  LM Tabulated value (X
2
) at 5%  





Median  2.000 
Test statistic 87.141 
Degree of freedom 4 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .000 
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4.4.1 Test for normality 
Normality tests are usually assumed in statistical research resulting to misleading 
misinterpretations and unreliable inferences (Park, 2006). According to Ghesani & Zahediatsl 
(2012) violation of normality should not be problematic if data is large (n>30 or 40) but 
never the less this study considered the normality test. Normality tests were done using P-P 
plot and histogram which are descriptive statistics (Zhang, 2008). The histogram was well 
curved but with spikes. The P-P plot (Figure 4.4) showed some points lay outside the straight 
line. Skewness and kurtosis were also used to check for normality. According to table 4.3, 
skewness is not zero and kurtosis is not 3 or -3 which led to the conclusion that the data is 
non parametric. 
 






4.4.2 Test for auto correlation 
Autocorrelation refers to a situation where residuals in a model are correlated (Wooldridge, 
2016). The null hypothesis was H0: no autocorrelation and H1: there was autocorrelation. 
Durbin Watson statistic was used to test for autocorrelation.  From table 4.4, the calculated 
Durbin Watson statistics results (1.854), was closer to 2 and so the null hypothesis was 
rejected, meaning there is autocorrelation.  
4.4.3 Test for multi-collinearity 
According to Wooldridge (2016), multi-collinearity is a problem which arises when two or 
more independent variables are highly correlated.  Tolerance values in table 4.4 are less than 
1 which means there is multi-collinearity. Variance inflation factor (VIF) was also used to 
test whether the presence of multi-collinearity was statistically significant. VIF values which 
are between 1and 10 indicate multi-collinearity. Thus diagnostic tests results (tolerance and 
VIF) in table 4.4 show there is multi-collinearity.  
4.4.4 Test for heteroscedasticity  
The common assumption in regression is that the error term has equal variance. However in 
real life this assumption is not guaranteed and it is therefore important to detect 
heteroscedasticity in the error term before making inferences. Heteroscedasticity refers to 
situations where the variance is not constant which violates the assumptions of the error term.  
For non-parametric data this test is proposed based on squared residuals (Zhang, 2008). In 
this study Lagrange Multiplier (LM) was used to test for heteroscedasticity. This was 
calculated using R2 from the auxiliary regression and multiplying it by the number of 
observations, that is, TR2 ∼ χ2 (n) where n is the number of regressors in the auxiliary 
regression. The null hypothesis being tested was H0; homoscedasticity while the alternative 
was H1; heteroscedasticity. As illustrated by the overall model in table 4.4, the LM value was 







4.5 Bivariate analysis 
A bivariate analysis is a statistical method for analyzing relationship between two variables 
(Cui & Graetorex, 2015). Under this section, the study focused on analysis where exactly two 
measurements are made on an observation. In this study a correlation test was done on the 
relationship between fraud types and agent banks characteristics. 
4.5.1 Association between Fraud types and agent banks characteristics   
A spearman rank order correlation was done. This type of a non-parametric test is used to 
evaluate degree of association between two variables (Hilbe, 2009). Calculation of 
spearman’s correlation coefficient and significance testing requires that one variable is 
monotonically related to the other and that the scores are ordinal (Coffman, Maydeu, & 
Arnau, 2010). The analysis was done to establish whether there was a correlation between the 
agent banks characteristics and fraud types. A summary of the correlation results are 
presented in table 4.5. Significant probabilities are indicated in brackets in the correlation 
matrix table.  The results showed that age of the business has a high positive significant 
relationship with split deposits (0.015, p<0.05). This could be attributed to the fact that as 
agent banks mature, the employees or owners understand the business better and able to 
manipulate it to reward themselves higher commissions. This is in agreement with (Albrecht 
et al, 2006) who found that as businesses age, fraud becomes more sophisticated  but 
similarly the business owners understand the tricks used by fraudsters. The study established 
that unauthorised access of agent transactional data has a significant positive relationship 
with proximity to bank branches (0.027, p<0.05). This means that the further a bank branch 
is, the higher the likelihood of customer exploitation by the agents. The reasoning behind this 
could be the agents feel the customers have no other alternative to bank services. The fake 
ATMs showed a significant positive relationship with proximity to bank branches (0.059, 
p<0.1).This could be attributed to the fact that agents who are further away from main banks 
are more prone to fake ATMs exploitation. Unauthorized PIN access showed a positively 
significant relationship with acting for many banks (0.07, p<0.1). The more the number of 
banks the agent acted for, the higher the likelihood of risk of unauthorized PINs. There was a 
significant negative relation in proximity to bank branch with unauthorized customer charges 
(0.019, p<0.05). As proximity to bank branch decrease unauthorized charges increase. This 
could be because the agents feel that the customer has a reason to not visit the bank branch 
maybe to avoid the long queues, so the agents make them pay for such luxuries. The agents 
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could justify this by arguing that the opportunity costs that the customers incur to visit a bank 
branch will be higher than the charges at the agent banks. This finding agrees with the 
argument that agent banks bring services closer to the customers but comes with costs like 
possible exploitation (CGAP, 2015; Atandi, 2013).  
Identity theft had a significant negative relationship with age of the business (0.055, p<0.1). 
As a business matures, fraudsters learn new loopholes they can manipulate. Agents may over 
time get used to certain customers, leading to laxity on checking their specific details but the 
customers will in turn come up with other fraud types while appearing clean on identity 
issues. This agrees with previous findings that fraud risk awareness should be a continuous 
process as any opportunity will be taken advantage of (Bell & Jhang, 2011). Registration of 
customers with fake details was negatively related with the location of the agent banks at 
significance levels of (0.08, p<0.1). Location and extortion similarly showed a positive 




Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix 
Counterfei
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r .111 -.094 -.083 1.000
p .229 .308 .372
r .157 -.122 -.200
* -.056 1.000
p .089 .185 .030 .542
r -.120 .081 .068 -.063 -.119 1.000
p .194 .380 .460 .496 .196
r .016 .107 .154 -.099 .063 .100 1.000
p .861 .246 .094 .282 .498 .281
r .040 .151 -.010 .065 -.164 -.055 -.093 1.000
p .663 .100 .914 .483 .074 .555 .315
r .022 .137 -.124 .034 .059 -.053 .022 .098 1.000
p .815 .139 .180 .714 .525 .564 .811 .288
r .008 .004 -.025 -.016 -.004 -.006 -.074 .123 -.107 1.000
p .931 .969 .789 .859 .963 .948 .423 .183 .248
r -.156 -.027 .037 .076 -.002 -.116 .114 -.106 -.049 -.018 1.000
p .090 .773 .692 .410 .986 .208 .216 .252 .600 .845
r .050 .132 .034 -.089 -.092 -.019 -.087 .152 .048 .070 -.154 1.000
p .590 .152 .717 .335 .321 .838 .349 .099 .604 .452 .094
r -.001 .096 -.003 .067 .045 -.059 .010 .121 .044 .052 -.109 -.030 1.000
p .991 .300 .974 .469 .625 .523 .915 .189 .638 .574 .239 .747
r -.081 -.127 -.003 .052 .063 -.075 -.002 -.040 -.079 -.002 -.080 -.071 .053
p .383 .170 .973 .573 .499 .415 .984 .667 .396 .979 .389 .441 .567
r -.151 .020 .080 -0.176*** -.146 .222
** -.008 .008 0.051* -.132 -.019 .063 -.114 1.000
p .101 .832 .385 (0.055) .113 (0.015) .927 .928 (0.578) .153 .838 .499 .216
r .102 -.073 .058 -.031 .100 -.120 .065 0.180* .106 -0.161* -.087 -.040 .031 -.096 1.000
p .271 .427 .534 .741 .278 .193 .480 (0.050) .250 (0.08) .347 .665 .734 .299
r -.060 .051 -.005 -.097 .038 .028 -.007 -.056 .099 -.016 -.002 -.023 -.116 -.010 .141 1.000
p .513 .581 .961 .296 .680 .765 .944 .547 .282 .866 .981 .806 .210 .913 .126
r .010 -.009 -.087 -.024 .061 .075 -.146 .020 -.038 .010 -.023 .148 -.211
* .023 .097 .202
* 1.000
p .918 .924 .346 .799 .507 .415 .114 .831 .678 .916 .806 .109 .022 .808 .294 .028
r .074 .002 -.065 -.069 0.173* -.068 -.081 -.071 -.214
* .103 .203
** .136 -.060 -.096 -.123 -.062 .080 1.000
p .422 .986 .485 .454 (0.059) .461 .380 .441 (0.019) .265 (0.027) .140 .514 .297 .181 .506 .384
r .006 .116 .098 -.128 0.029 .123 0.166* .008 .110 -.001 -.082 -.028 .034 -.061 .205
* .027 -.012 -.093 1.000
p .947 .208 .288 .164 .755 .184 (0.070) .931 .235 .993 .378 .759 .717 .512 .025 .769 .894 .314
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
Proximity to bank 
branch
Many banks
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Stand-alone or other































4.6. Multivariate analysis 
A multivariate data analysis is a statistical technique where more than one variable is 
analyzed (Frederick, 2013). It is a collection of methods applied to test variables in a sample 
(Rencher, 2001). The variables herein were investigated to test effectiveness in agency 
banking and their effect on activity levels. For purposes of this study, frequencies, factor 
analysis, and ordinal regression models were used. 
4.6.1 Governance and leadership 
This was measured in terms of how policies and procedures as well as management are 
engaged in fighting fraud. Looking at how clear the code of conduct was to the agents was 
also used. Many respondents felt that management played a huge role in fraud prevention. 
There was however some few people who felt that the policies and procedures were not very 
clear. This was mainly attributed to use of jargons that are not easily understood.  As shown 
in appendix vii, Governance reported a high percentage in effectiveness. 
4.6.2 Preventive measures 
Appendix vii showed that all the surveyed agent banks had adopted preventive measures and 
they were very effective. Some went as far as installing CCTV cameras and having ultra 
violet lights which detect counterfeit notes. Agents ensure verification of customer 
identification. Some banks have hotlines that deal with fraud alerts. The banks also engage 
the agents in case there are new fraud activities through SMSs. This way the agents know 
what to look out for and remain vigilant. 
4.6.3 Response 
The manner in which banks respond to fraud occurrences in agent banks reported low 
percentages in term of effectiveness. Response was measured in terms of corrective checks 
and investigative procedures. When agents report fraud, they are not notified by the affiliate 
banks on the progress of the investigations. Most agents felt there is no need to report fraud 






4.6.4 Detective practices 
Detective techniques looked at whistleblowing, mystery shopping and surprise audits. The 
results showed there is laxity in terms of surprise audits by affiliate banks. This majorly 
contributed to the low percentage in terms of effectiveness. As much as whistle blowing is 
encouraged and done by agents, they feel that the banks do not respond in good time. 
4.6.5 Monitoring and Training.  
Most of the respondents were not satisfied with the training and monitoring by the banks on 
agency banking activities. Most employees did on the job training through the business 
owners. Agents were clueless on whether the banks are supposed to take them through any 
form of training. 
4.6.6 Kruskal-Wallis Test and Pairwise comparisons. 
The frequency tables (Appendix vii) on effectiveness of fraud risk management practices 
showed that governance, monitoring and detective compared better to response and 
monitoring. A Kruskal-wallis test was done to ascertain how the variables ranked against 
each other. According to Hole (2011) this test is an equivalent of the one way ANOVA for 
parametric data.  It is appropriate for comparison of more than three conditions, if they are 
measured in an ordinal scale. Table 4.4 indicated that there was a significant difference in the 
medians, (d.f 4, N = 595, p =.000).  After the significance was established, post hoc analysis 
was conducted to establish where the differences lie. 
Table 4.6a: Pairwise comparisons 
Variable 1  versus       Variable  2 Test statistic Significance Adj. Sig 
Governance vs.  Preventive 1.482 .223 1.000 
Governance vs. Response 25.790 .000 .000 
Governance vs. Detective 21.857 .000 .000 
Governance vs. Monitoring 60.639 .000 .000 
Preventive   vs.  Response 13.043 .000 .003 
Preventive   vs.  Detective 2.311 .128 1.000 
Preventive vs.  Monitoring 42.824 .000 .000 
Response    vs.  Detective 4.695 .030 .303 
Response     vs. Monitoring 10.206 .001 .014 
Detective     vs. Monitoring 27.538 .000 .000 
Asymptotic significances (2-sided tests) are displayed.  
The significance level is 0.05 
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Table 4.6a shows a statistically significant difference between Governance and Response 
(Test statistic = 25.79, p value 0.000 < 0.05), Governance and Detective (Test statistic = 
21.857, p value 0.000 < 0.05) and Governance and monitoring (Test statistic = 60.639, p 
value 0.000 < 0.05) but between Governance and Preventive there was no significant 
difference (Test statistic = 1.482, p value 0.223 > 0.05). There was a statistically significant 
difference between Preventive and Response (Test statistic = 13.043, P value 0.000 < 0.05), 
Preventive and Monitoring (Test statistic = 42.824, P value 0.000 < 0.05) but between 
preventive and detective there was no significance (Test statistic = 2.311, P value 0.128 > 
0.05). There was a significant difference between Response and Detective (Test statistic = 
4.695, P value 0.030 < 0.05) and also between Response and Monitoring (Test statistic = 
10.206, P value 0.001 < 0.05). Between Detective and Monitoring there was significance 
(Test statistic = 27.538, P value 0.000 < 0.05).  
The tests conducted to test pairwise comparisons showed that governance and preventive 
were not significantly different (p=.223) as well as preventive and detective (p=.128). All the 
other pairs were different; Governance and Response, Detective and Monitoring, Governance 
and Monitoring, Preventive and Response, Preventive and Monitoring, Governance and 
Detective all at p=.000, Response and monitoring (p=0.01), response and detective (p=0.03).  
At 95% confidence level, the conclusion is that governance and preventive at (mean score = 
1, median score = 1) each are the highest in effectiveness, followed by response and detective 
(mean score = 2, median score = 2) and monitoring ranks lowest in effectiveness (mean score 
= 3, median score = 3). This confirms previous results where, Governance, Preventive and 
Detective measures have different median levels when compared to other measures and 
therefore being most effective. They showed a .000 significance which is less than 0.05, 
leading to rejection of the null hypothesis that the distribution of the median across categories 







4.6.7 Factor analysis  
Factor analysis is a statistical procedure which tests previously correlated multiple variables 
with an aim of describing variability among them  (Sweet & Martin, 2014). This is necessary 
because respondents often give similar answers to associated variables. A factor is the 
dimension which tries to show differences in the variables (Frederick H.Long, 2013).  The 
factors are usually as many as the variables, and each individual factor captures some amount 
of the overall variance.  
The study applied factor analysis to analyse effectiveness of fraud risk management 
techniques adopted in agent banks. Factor analysis operates on the notation that it retains the 
character and nature of variables, by reducing their numbers and hence simplifying the 
multivariate analysis (Yong & Pearce, 2013). Bartlett test was done and showed that the 
variables are significantly correlated (0.007, p<0.05) which provided a reasonable basis for 
factor analysis. From tables 4.6c amounts of variance in the original variances which are 
accounted for by each component are presented. The percentage of variance column shows 
ratio of the variance accounted for by each component to the total variance expressed as a 
percentage while the cumulative percentage column presents that percentage of variance 
accounted for by the first n components (Yong & Pearce, 2013). The first factor shows 
15.102% variance, second 13.344%, third 13.043%, fourth 11.355% and fifth 10.021%.Scree 
plot presentation (figure 4.6) was used to determine how many factors should be retained. 
Eigenvalues are measures of variance that the factors explain (Frederick H.Long, 2013). Five 
factors were retained as they had Eigenvalue of more than 1. The component matrix shows 
extraction values and those with higher loadings are selected. A rotated component matrix 
which changes nothing but simplifies interpretation of analysis was done.  Table 4.6c shows 
Process checks and management reported effectiveness at 0.713 and 0.858 respectively. 
Whistle blowing and customer identification were effective at 0.683 and 0.794. The other 







Table 4.6b: Results of factor analysis: Total Variance explained 
Fraud risk management Total Variance Explained 
Component 














Process checks 1.510 15.102 15.102 1.510 15.102 15.102 1.361 13.614 13.614 
Training 1.334 13.344 28.446 1.334 13.344 28.446 1.276 12.757 26.370 
Corrective checks 1.304 13.043 41.489 1.304 13.043 41.489 1.276 12.755 39.126 
Know Your Customer 1.136 11.355 52.844 1.136 11.355 52.844 1.217 12.168 51.294 
Whistle blowing 1.002 10.021 62.865 1.002 10.021 62.865 1.157 11.572 62.865 
Monitoring & supervision .926 9.264 72.129             
Mystery shopping .826 8.260 80.389             
Management .788 7.877 88.266             
Structured agent feedback sessions .687 6.872 95.138             
Process checks .486 4.862 100.000             
 
Fraud risk management and activity levels Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 











Variance             Cumulative % 
Policies and responsibilities 1.681 24.017 24.017 1.681 24.017 24.017 1.524 21.764 21.764 
Fraud reporting procedures 1.162 16.593 40.610 1.162 16.593 40.610 1.266 18.090 39.854 
Fraud risk identification 1.076 15.374 55.984 1.076 15.374 55.984 1.129 16.130 55.984 
Understanding code of conduct .968 13.828 69.812             
Monitoring  & training .906 12.943 82.755             
Whistle blowing .637 9.107 91.862             
Investigation procedures .570 8.138 100.000             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Figure 4.6:  Results on factor analysis; FRM scree plot 
 
Scree plot presentation above was used to determine how many factors should be retained. 
Five factors were retained as they have Eigenvalue of more than 1 
Table 4.6c: Results of factor analysis 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .432 




From above table, Bartlett tests showed that the variables are significantly correlated at 0.001, 












Fraud risk identification .785   
Monitoring  & training .651   
Policies and responsibilities .554   
Investigation procedures  .805  
Whistle blowing  -.565  
Fraud reporting procedures   .738 
Understanding code of conduct   .610 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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4.7 Fraud risk management and level of activity by agent banks. 
Factor analysis was done before the regression analysis. Bartlett tests in table 4.6c and 
extraction of variables was done and a residual matrix was calculated. This followed 
successive extraction to check whether there was a large enough variance accounted for in the 
correlation matrix (Brett, Ted, & Onsman, 2012).  According to table 4.6c on variance 
summary with activity levels, the first three components showed 24.017%, 16.593% and 
15.374% variability.  
From the rotated component matrix in table 4.6c, fraud risk identification, monitoring and 
policies were highly correlated to activity levels at 0.785, 0.651 and 0.554 respectively. 
Investigative procedures and whistleblowing reported correlation at 0.805 and -0.565 while 
fraud reporting procedures and code of conduct showed 0.738 and 0.610 correlation 
respectively.  
Having confirmed that there exist a relationship between the independent and dependent 
variable, an ordinal logistic regression was performed. According to (Long, 2012), an ordinal 
logistic regression is a statistical technique used to predict behaviour of ordinal level 
dependent variables with a set of independent variables. Thus the mehod was used because 
the dependent variable was in  likert scale. 
The model is thus defined as; 
Activity levels= f{Fraud risk management practices+Fraud types+ Agent banks 
characteristics} 
Before looking at the effects of the variables, there was need to test whether the model 
improved ability to predict the outcome. This was done by comparing a model without any of 
the variables (Baseline or “Intercept only” model) against one with all variables (Final). This 







Table 4.7: Final Model  
Model 
        -2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-
Square       Sig. 
             
df. 
Intercept Only 304.045       
Final 216.786 87.259            .023 63 
Cox and Snell .520 
Nagelkerke .563 
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi- Square       df             Sig. 
Null Hypothesis 216.786       
General                .000
b
 216.786       126     .000 
 
a. Link function: Logit. 
b. The log-likelihood value is practically zero. There may be a complete separation in the data. 
The maximum likelihood estimates do not exist. 
  95% Confidence 
level 
Variables    Transactions 
                      Per week 
Estimate Std. 
Error 




Preventive     vs          <50  -13.060*** 2.705  0.002                     23.306 1 .000 -18.363  -7.758 
Preventive     vs     51-100 -12.611*** 2.683  0.003                     22.092 1 .000 -17.870  -7.352 
Preventive      vs  101-500 -12.749*** 2.775  0.003                      21.111 1 .000 -18.188  -7.311 
Detective         vs        <50 -17.897*** 3.293  0.000                       29.540 1 .000 -24.351 -11.443 
Detective         vs    51-100 -16.052*** 3.214  0.000                        24.944 1 .000 -22.351  -9.753 
Detective         vs  101-500 -18.071*** 3.333  0.000                     29.399 1 .000 -24.603 -11.539 
Monitoring      vs       < 50 17.147*** .666  0.895 662.583 1 .000 15.841  18.452 
Fake ATMs -1.793* 1.084   0.718 2.736 1 .098 -.332   3.917 
Debit cards Skimming -2.317*** .827   0.099                   7.841 1 .005 -3.938 -0.695 
Identity theft -3.752*** 1.210   0.023 9.621 1 .002 -6.123 -1.381 
Unauthorized PIN access 2.224** .915   9.24 5.908 1 .015 0.431 4.017 
Imposing unauthorized 
customer charges 
-1.411** .721   0.243 3.837 1 .050 -2.824 0.001 
Registration of customers 
with fake details 
1.658*** .623   5.247 7.086 1 .008 0.437 2.878 
Customer collusion with 
employees 
3.464*** .906  31.934 14.627 1 .000 1.689 5.239 
***P<0.01 
 **P<0.05 




  Chi-Square   df         Sig. 
Pearson 817.093 291      1.000 
Deviance 216.786 291     1.000 
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The Model fitting Information table gave the -2 log-likelihood values for the baseline and the 
final models.  A chi-square to test the difference between the 2LL for the two models was 
then performed. The significant chi-square statistic (p = 0.023 < 0.05) indicates that the Final 
model gives a significant improvement over the baseline/intercept-only model and thus gave 
better predictions. A goodness of fit test using Pearson's chi-square statistic and deviance chi-
square statistic was done to test whether the observed data was consistent with the fitted 
model. The null hypothesis being that the fit is good, if the p value is large, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. The results revealed (p=1.00>.05) thus the model does fit very well 
leading to conclusion that the data and the model predictions are similar, and the model is 
good. A further analysis of the goodness of fit was assessed using the Pseudo R squared. In 
the linear regression model, the coefficient of determination summarizes the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable associated with the predictor (independent) variables, with 
larger values indicating that more of the variation is explained by the model. Two models 
(Nagelkerke and Cox & Snell) were used for estimating the coefficient of determination. The 
model with the largest statistic (56.3%) was considered. 
The test of parallel lines was used to assess whether it is reasonable to make the assumption 
that parameters are the same for all categories. This test compared the ordinal model which 
had one set of coefficients for all thresholds (labelled Null Hypothesis), to a model with a 
separate set of coefficients for each threshold (labelled General). From the results in table 4.7 
the null hypothesis was rejected (P value = 0.000< 0.05). 
The parameter estimates in table 4.7 summarized the effect of each predictor. The sign of the 
coefficients for factor levels give important interpretations regarding effects of the predictors 
in the model (Yong & Pearce, 2013). A factor level with a greater coefficient indicates a 
greater probability of being in one of the "higher" cumulative outcome categories. The sign 
of a coefficient for a factor level is dependent upon that factor level's effect relative to the 
reference categories. 
 
From table 4.7 the risk practices which have statistically significant (p=0.000<0.05) 
relationship with activity levels are preventive, detective and monitoring measures. The 
particular fraud types in the table also have a statistically significant (p<.1and p<.05) 
relationship with activity levels of agent banks. 
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4.8 Chapter Summary 
Respondents indicated that fraud is prevalent in agency banking. Results revealed 
respondents have experienced Fake SMSs (83.2% N=99), Extortion (74.7%), Fake ATMs 
(56.3%N=67), Counterfeit money & access of agent transactional data (53.8%), Unauthorised 
PIN access (53%) and registration of customers with fake details (51.2%). The other fraud 
types which were not as high in terms of frequency are Debit card skimming (47.1%N=56), 
Identity theft (47.9 N=57), Split deposits (47.18%N=57) unauthorised customer charges 
(41.1%). Interestingly even the fraud types, whose percentages were low, were reported by 
close to half of the respondents. 
The correlation analysis showed that the number of years that an establishment had been 
operation had a positively significant relationship with split deposits and unauthorized 
customer charges. As the business matured, the risk of identity fraud reduced. Agent banks’ 
proximity to bank branches revealed a positive relationship to fake ATMs and unauthorised 
access of agent data, but a negative relationship to unauthorized charges. Location had a 
significant correlation with extortion and registration of customers with fake details. Agent 
banks that acted for many banks recorded a high positive correlation to unauthorised PIN 
access.  
Since the distribution of data was not normal, a non-parametric (median) test was done to 
check the relationship between the different fraud risk management practices. This was done 
by testing for differences or similarities between the practices. Factor analysis confirmed that 
risk management practices are sufficient to be analysed for effectiveness. This began by a 
hypothesis where the null hypothesis was rejected since p=.00<0.05, confirming that there 
was a difference between the medians across the categories. The Kruskal-wallis and pairwise 
comparison tests confirmed that risk management practices were different. Preventive, 
Governance and detective measures were found to be most effective in agency banking while 
Monitoring was found to be the least effective. Most respondents were unsure about 
effectiveness of the response practices. This agreed with (Ohando, 2014) who found that 
preventive, detective and management input play a major role in reducing fraud in Kenyan 
banks.  
Finally the study sought to establish what effect the fraud risk management practices had on 
activity levels by agent banks. Results on factor analysis showed there was evidence of a 
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relationship between the practices and activity levels. An ordinal logistic regression showed 
that preventive, detective and monitoring measures had a statistically significant relationship 
to activity levels. These findings were also found by (Ezekiel & Isaiah, 2016  and Kedir & 
Adriana, 2016). Preventive and detective measures had a negative relationship with activity 
levels. This  could mean that when customers are aware of  stringent preventive and 
deterrents to fraud, they do not risk tricking the agents. If a customer is aware that an agent 
bank has ultra violet lights to test for counterfeit money, there is a likelihood that they will 
not try their luck with counterfeit notes. This could also be attributed to the argument that 
these measures usually show high positive relationships with performance of  companies that 
invest heavily in intellectual capital (Ezekiel & Isaiah, 2016). 
The fraud types which showed a negatively statistically significant relationship to activity 
levels were Fake ATMs Imposition of unauthorized customer charges, Identity theft and 
Debit cards Skimming. This agrees with previous studies that as activity levels increase in 
AB, some fraud types reduce because there is more awareness and understanding to what to 




CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations based on the 
research objectives and existing empirical literature.  The chapter is organized in order of the 
study objectives. The primary objective was to investigate the effect of fraud risk 
management practices on activity levels by agent banks in Nairobi County. The specific 
objectives sought to establish whether there existed any relationship between fraud types and 
characteristics of agent banks.  Also to find out which fraud risk management practices were 
adopted to curb fraud in agent banks and finally analyse the association between the practices 
and activity levels. 
The background provided a detailed profile on the role of risk management and agency 
banking by highlighting what is known so far, the inconsistencies and contradictions. It was 
clear from the problem statement that there is a social and research problem in fraud risk 
management in agency banking.  The study adopted a positivistic approach and a mix of 
descriptive and explanatory research designs for objectivity in describing characteristics and 
functions as well as following a structured research process. The population was the agent 
banks in Nairobi County and a hundred and fifty (150) questionnaires were distributed to 
agents. Data collected was checked for accuracy and completeness, edited, compiled. It was 
then tested for normality, multi-collinearity and heteroscedasticity and analyzed to answer the 
research questions using SPSS and Excel software.  
5.2 Discussion of findings 
Data was collected from one hundred and nineteen agent banks in Nairobi County. The 
findings of the study are as discussed below.  
5.2.1 Association between fraud types of agent banks characteristics. 
This was done using a correlation analysis. The results showed that age of the business had a 
high positive significant relationship with split deposits (0.015, p<0.05) and unauthorized 
customer charges (0.92, p<0.1). This was attributed to the fact that as agent banks mature, the 
employees or owners understand the business better and thus able to manipulate the system. 
This is in agreement with (Albrecht et al, 2006) who found that as businesses age, fraud 
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becomes more sophisticated but similarly the business owners understand tricks by fraudsters 
who in turn invent complex fraud types. Identity theft reported a significant negative 
relationship with age of the business (0.055, p<0.1). As a business matures, fraudsters learn 
new loopholes they can manipulate. This agrees with previous findings that fraud risk 
awareness should be a continuous process as fraud becomes more sophisticated (Bell & 
Jhang, 2011). 
Proximity to bank branches had a significant positive relationship with unauthorised access of 
agent transactional data (0.027, p<0.05) and fake ATMs (0.059, p< 0.01). The further the 
agent bank is to a main branch, the higher the risk of exploiting customers.  Similarly the 
further the main branch is, the higher the risk of use of fake ATMs. The nature of these 
results confirmed (Dias & McKee, 2010) argument on the need for consumer protection in 
branchless banking. There was a significant negative relation in proximity to bank branch 
with unauthorized customer charges (0.02, p<0.05). As proximity to bank branch decrease 
unauthorized charges increase. Location and extortion showed a positive significant 
relationship (0.05, p<0.1), and a negative one with registration of customers with fake details 
(0.08, p<0.1). This could be interpreted that for customers to be registered with fake details, 
there is laxity on the side of the agents who are supposed to verify customer information. 
Training and monitoring through surprise visits and mystery shopping by banks could help 
alleviate this as proposed by (Alexandra, 2011). 
Acting on behalf of many banks had a positive significant relationship with unauthorized PIN 
access (0.71, p<0.1). This means that banks should work together as opposed to individually 
as they encounter same fraudsters due to not sharing the information amongst themselves. 
This was also found to be true in a study on fraud in the banking industry by (Akelola, 2012).  
Age, proximity, location and acting for multiple banks showed relationship with different 
fraud types and therefore there is need to further examine what can be done to curb the fraud 
types to enhance performance.  
5.2.2 Risk management practices adopted in agent banks. 
The study sought to establish which risk management practices are adopted in curbing fraud 
related challenges in agent banks. They were ranked in order of effectiveness using frequency 
tables and factor analysis. Mode which was the most frequent score in the data set in terms of 
effectiveness was recorded. The percentages were Preventive (100), Governance (84.9), 
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Detective (39.5), Response (21.8), and Monitoring (13.4). This was in agreement with factor 
analysis which showed Process checks (0.713), management (0.858), whistle blowing (0.683) 
and customer identification (0.794) were effective. A hypothesis was done to check the 
relationship between the different risk management practices. The p value was 0.00 which is 
less than 0.05 and led to rejection of the null hypothesis (The medians are the same across the 
practices). To avoid making the type 1 error, further tests were done. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
showed there was significant difference between the five practices. A further pairwise 
comparison test was conducted. Governance with preventive (p=.223) and preventive with 
detective (p=.128) were not significantly different. All the other pairs were different; 
Governance and Response, Detective and Monitoring, Governance and Monitoring, 
Preventive and Response, Preventive and Monitoring, Governance and Detective all at 
p=.000, Response and monitoring (p=0.01), response and detective (p=0.03). This meant 
there was agreement between the statistical conclusions.  
This means that the agent banks are very aggressive in preventive measures like verification 
of customer details and other technical issues in fraud fight. The code of conduct was clear to 
the agents but the policies and procedures set out by affiliate banks were not easily 
understood. The detective practices ranked low because the affiliate banks didn’t participate 
as expected. The agents cited major competition by mobile companies like Safaricom who 
are very aggressive in surprise audits and mystery shoppers to ensure their agents are 
following what is prescribed. The respondents felt that response was not important because 
the banks never notified them on the progress of investigative procedures. In terms of training 
and monitoring the banks fail to offer support to the agents. 
5.2.3 Fraud risk management practices and activity levels by agent banks 
To analyse the impact of fraud risk management on activity levels, factor analysis was done 
followed by ordinal logistic regression. Factor analysis began with Bartlett test which showed 
there was a strong significant relationship between the variables at 0.001, p<0.05. The 
extracted sums of squared loadings showed 55.984% variance for three factors. The rotated 
component matrix showed fraud risk identification (0.785), monitoring (0.651), policies 
(0.554), investigative procedures (0.805), whistleblowing (-0.565), fraud reporting 




Regression analysis procedure started with model fitting information to determine if the 
model improves ability to predict the outcome. This gave a significant chi-square statistic 
(p=0.023<0.05) meaning the model would give better predictions than probabilities. This was 
followed by a goodness of fit test resulting to Pearson’s Chi-square (p =1.00 > .05) and 
deviance chi-square (p = 1.00 > .05).  Pseudo R Squared was done using two measures, and 
the one with larger values (56.3%) was picked as it indicated that more of the variation could 
be explained by the model. From the parameter estimates, preventive and detective measures 
had negatively statistically significant relationship with levels of activity (p<.05). This could 
mean that when agent banks put measures, fraudsters are scared of trying their tricks lest they 
are caught. Monitoring had a positive significant relationship (p<.05) with activity levels and 
therefore the affiliate banks should have measures in place for training and monitoring. If 
banks monitor the agent banks there will be increased customer confidence and this will 
entice them to deal with the agents. Some fraud types (Fake ATMs, Imposition of 
unauthorized customer charges, Identity theft and Debit cards skimming) had a negative 
statistically significant relationship with activity levels. 
5.3 Research implications and recommendations 
5.3.1 Policy recommendations 
The findings of this study provide foresight to policy makers and regulators in the banking 
industry and the government towards achievement of the vision 2030 to create a vibrant and 
globally competitive financial sector. Respondents felt that banks use jargons and their 
policies are not easily understood. Policy makers should ensure that policies and procedures 
are understandable and banks do not exploit the agents as seen when agents have 
unauthorised access to customer transactional data. These findings should start a debate on 
whether all stakeholders are at play in enhancing financial inclusion through agency banking.  
The stakeholders in this are the customers, agents, banks, regulators and the government. 
There is a part that each of them should play to prevent and reduce fraud related challenges. 
The banks should deal with fraud as a sector as opposed to individually to reduce suffering 





5.3.2 Managerial recommendations 
The study findings will be useful to bank managers. Bank managers in charge of agent banks 
should improve their training, monitoring and supervisory duties. The analysis identified poor 
monitoring, training and supervision of agents. Additionally, given the fact that most fraud is 
not reported due to poor response by banks, managers should ensure that this information is 
used to improve the areas that showed ineffectiveness. The managers can adopt mystery 
shopping, rewards for agents that perform well and scheduled training sessions. Banks should 
also ensure customer information is secure and punishment is taken against those who exploit 
customers. CBK (2016) had recommended a central data repository for agents but this did not 
happen. The aim was to prevent blacklisted agents from jumping ship to other banks and 
continuing with the same misconduct that led to their dismissal.  
5.4 Contribution to knowledge 
Prior studies focused on challenges in agency banking and fraud has been identified   as one 
of them. This study contributes to literature by looking at the measures which are adopted by 
agent banks to fight fraud. It also investigated the relationships between agent banks 
characteristics and fraud types and linked the fraud risk management practices to activity 
levels. The findings form basis for further research in agency banking. Previous studies had 
not linked fraud risk management in agency banking to growth but this study did. The 
conclusion was that prevention, detection and monitoring affect level of activities by agent 
banks. When compared to previous research, this study adopted a larger sample size because 
agency banking is growing and so a larger sample would be more representative of the 
expanded model. After the normality test data was analysed in its raw form without 
transforming it to show normalcy. This led to adoption of non-parametric measures like 
ordinal logistic regression and Kruskal Wallis tests where previously simple regression and 
one way ANOVA were use respectively. The findings therefore were as a result of different 






5.5 Areas of further study 
Since this study focused on agent banks, it would be necessary to investigate the measures 
taken by affiliate banks in curbing agency banking fraud. Further research should be done by 
focusing on other financial and operational measures as this study focused only on the 
number of transactions. 
5.6 Limitations of the study 
Some limitations were encountered during this study. Agent banks are located all over the 
county and given the time constraints it was not possible to study all of them. Nairobi County 
which is home to all the commercial banks which have adopted agency banking was therefore 
selected and thus the sample used was highly representative. Future studies need to gather 
data from other counties and compare to reduce cultural, institutional and other biases.  
Since fraud is a sensitive issue, few people were willing to give any information. Most 
respondents sought to portray efficiency and thus held back on sensitive information. There 
were also limitations in terms of response rate. The response rate was 79% (119 out of 150) 
as opposed to 100% which would have given more comprehensive results. The fact that the 
study focused on agent banks’ was also a limiting factor in that respondents thought the 
information was to be used by their competitors.  
Agency banking is a fairly new model in Kenya having started in 2010. The empirical study 
done on the area in Kenya is limited compared to what has been done in foreign countries 
like Brazil, India and Latin America. This study borrowed and compared with similar studies 
from those countries.  
Most agent banks conduct other businesses and as many small businesses do not have book 
keeping records in place. This was a major hindrance to accessing information since there 
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Appendix II: Questionnaire 
 SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
1. Kindly tick against your gender.   Male [   ] Female     [   ] 
 
2. Age 
        Below 30 years                  30- 39 years                 Over 40 years 
 
3. Kindly indicate highest level of education 
         O –Level    [   ]       Undergraduate    [   ]   Graduate    [   ] Other …………… 
 
4. Tick  appropriately 
        Owner    [   ]   Employee   [   ]    
SECTION B: FRAUD TYPES 
5. Please rate the following fraud types in order of how often they occur with 1 being ‘always’ 
and 5 being ‘Never’. 
 Always  
(1)  
Nearly always         
(2) 
Often   





Counterfeit money       
Fake SMS      
Debit card skimming      
Identity theft      
Fake ATMs      
Split deposits/withdrawals      
Unauthorised PIN access      
Extortion       
Imposing unauthorised customer 
charges. 
     
Registration of customers with 
fake details. 
     
Unauthorised access of agent 
transactional data 
     
Customer collude with 
employee to defraud agent 
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6. Rate how often you notify the affiliate bank(s) of fraud occurrences.  
Very often (1) Often (2) Neutral (3) Rarely (4) Very rarely (5) 
     
 
7. How satisfied are you with bank response to  agency fraud? 
Very satisfied (1) Satisfied (2)  Neutral (3)  Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (5) 
     
 
 
SECTION C: AGENT BANK CHARACTERISTICS 
8. The establishment has been in operation for? 
     Over 7 years [   ] 5 to 7 years [   ]    3 to 5 years [   ]   1 to 3 years [   ]     Less than 1 year [   ] 
9. Is it a stand-alone agent or it engages in other businesses? 
Stand- alone   Not stand – alone 
10. Ownership of the business. 
Sole proprietor [   ]    Partnership [   ]   Private limited Liability company [   ]   Other ……….. 
 
11. Please rate each of the following on how they influence occurrence of agency fraud with 1 
being ‘most influential’ and 5 being ‘least influential’.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Age of business      
Location      
Number of working hours      
Multiple businesses      
Proximity to bank branch      
Acting on behalf of more than one bank      
 
SECTION D: FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES   
12. How clear are anti- fraud measures to you? 
Very clear (1) Clear (2) Not sure (3) Barely clear (4) Not clear (5) 





13. Rate how effective each of the following is in curbing agency fraud. 
    Very   
effective  
     (1)     
   Effective 
      (2) 
Neutral 
   (3) 
Ineffective 
   (4) 
    Highly   
ineffective 
       (5) 
Management       
Know Your Customer      
Process checks      
Monitoring & supervision      
Whistle blowing      
Corrective checks      
Training       
Rewards for compliance      
Mystery shopping      
Structured agent feedback 
sessions 
     
 
 
14. Which of these measures do you take against fraud? Tick all correct answers 
Ultraviolet light sensitive test 
CCTV cameras 
Customer identification/verification   
Verifying bank instructions 
Other(s) ……………………………………………. 
 
15. How would you rate above measures in curbing agency fraud? 
Very effective 
(1) 
  Effective  
      (2) 
Neutral  
  (3) 
Ineffective  
   (4) 
Highly ineffective 
        (5) 


















   (1)    
Clear  
  (2) 
Less clear 
     (3)   
Not clear 
     (4)  
Very unclear 
     (5) 
Policies and 
responsibilities       
 
Fraud reporting 
procedures     
 
Fraud risk identification      
Code of conduct      
Monitoring and training 
procedures     
 
Whistle blowing 
procedures      
 
Investigative procedures      
 
17. How frequent are surprise audits and assessments done by affiliate bank(s)? 
 
Always   (1) Often (2) Sometimes  (3) Rarely (4) Never  (5) 
     
 
SECTION E: AGENT BANKS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
18. How many transactions do you serve per week? 
        0-50 [   ]  51-100 [   ]  101-500 [   ]  Above 500 [   ] 
 


















responsibilities       
 
Fraud reporting 
procedures     
 
Fraud risk 
identification     
 
Understanding code 
of conduct     
 
Monitoring  & 
training     
 
Whistle blowing      
Investigation 





20. Rate how each of these affect performance of the business? 
 Very much   
(1)    








Age of business      
Location      
Number of working hours      
Multiple  businesses      
Proximity to bank branch      
Acting for  more than one bank      
 
21. Rate the following support practices by affiliate banks on how they influence performance in 














Not at all 
influential 
(5) 
Training       
Assessment       
Inspection       
Surveillance       
  
Thank you for devoting your time to answering this questionnaire. 
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Appendix III: Correlation Matrix 
  
Counterfei




















on  with 
fake 
details.































r .111 -.094 -.083 1.000
p .229 .308 .372
r .157 -.122 -.200
* -.056 1.000
p .089 .185 .030 .542
r -.120 .081 .068 -.063 -.119 1.000
p .194 .380 .460 .496 .196
r .016 .107 .154 -.099 .063 .100 1.000
p .861 .246 .094 .282 .498 .281
r .040 .151 -.010 .065 -.164 -.055 -.093 1.000
p .663 .100 .914 .483 .074 .555 .315
r .022 .137 -.124 .034 .059 -.053 .022 .098 1.000
p .815 .139 .180 .714 .525 .564 .811 .288
r .008 .004 -.025 -.016 -.004 -.006 -.074 .123 -.107 1.000
p .931 .969 .789 .859 .963 .948 .423 .183 .248
r -.156 -.027 .037 .076 -.002 -.116 .114 -.106 -.049 -.018 1.000
p .090 .773 .692 .410 .986 .208 .216 .252 .600 .845
r .050 .132 .034 -.089 -.092 -.019 -.087 .152 .048 .070 -.154 1.000
p .590 .152 .717 .335 .321 .838 .349 .099 .604 .452 .094
r -.001 .096 -.003 .067 .045 -.059 .010 .121 .044 .052 -.109 -.030 1.000
p .991 .300 .974 .469 .625 .523 .915 .189 .638 .574 .239 .747
r -.081 -.127 -.003 .052 .063 -.075 -.002 -.040 -.079 -.002 -.080 -.071 .053
p .383 .170 .973 .573 .499 .415 .984 .667 .396 .979 .389 .441 .567
r -.151 .020 .080 -0.176*** -.146 .222
** -.008 .008 0.051* -.132 -.019 .063 -.114 1.000
p .101 .832 .385 (0.055) .113 (0.015) .927 .928 (0.578) .153 .838 .499 .216
r .102 -.073 .058 -.031 .100 -.120 .065 0.180* .106 -0.161* -.087 -.040 .031 -.096 1.000
p .271 .427 .534 .741 .278 .193 .480 (0.050) .250 (0.08) .347 .665 .734 .299
r -.060 .051 -.005 -.097 .038 .028 -.007 -.056 .099 -.016 -.002 -.023 -.116 -.010 .141 1.000
p .513 .581 .961 .296 .680 .765 .944 .547 .282 .866 .981 .806 .210 .913 .126
r .010 -.009 -.087 -.024 .061 .075 -.146 .020 -.038 .010 -.023 .148 -.211
* .023 .097 .202
* 1.000
p .918 .924 .346 .799 .507 .415 .114 .831 .678 .916 .806 .109 .022 .808 .294 .028
r .074 .002 -.065 -.069 0.173* -.068 -.081 -.071 -.214
* .103 .203
** .136 -.060 -.096 -.123 -.062 .080 1.000
p .422 .986 .485 .454 (0.059) .461 .380 .441 (0.019) .265 (0.027) .140 .514 .297 .181 .506 .384
r .006 .116 .098 -.128 0.029 .123 0.166* .008 .110 -.001 -.082 -.028 .034 -.061 .205
* .027 -.012 -.093 1.000
p .947 .208 .288 .164 .755 .184 (0.070) .931 .235 .993 .378 .759 .717 .512 .025 .769 .894 .314
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
Proximity to bank 
branch
Many banks
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Stand-alone or other































Appendix IV:  Regression Parameter Estimates 
  Estimate 
Std. 







Threshold [TRANSACTIONS<50] -18.441 4.567 16.303 1 .000 -27.393 -9.490 
[TRANSACTIONS 51-
100] 
-14.886 4.556 10.675 1 .001 -23.817 -5.956 
[TRANSACTIONS 
101-500] 
-12.381 4.575 7.324 1 .007 -21.349 -3.414 
Location [governance_<50] -1.011 1.004 1.013 1 .314 -2.979 .957 
[governanace_51-100] 0
a
     0       
[response <50] -6.234 4.930 1.599 1 .206 -15.896 3.428 
[response 51-100] -6.283 4.702 1.786 1 .181 -15.499 2.932 
[response_101-500] -5.632 4.750 1.406 1 .236 -14.942 3.678 
[response - >500] 0
a
     0       
[preventive- <50] -13.060 2.705 23.306 1 .000 -18.363 -7.758 
[preventive_51-100] -12.611 2.683 22.092 1 .000 -17.870 -7.352 
[preventive_101-500] -12.749 2.775 21.111 1 .000 -18.188 -7.311 
[preventive- >500] 0
a
     0       
[preventive=5] 0
a
     0       
[detective_=<50] -17.897 3.293 29.540 1 .000 -24.351 -11.443 
[detective_=51-100] -16.052 3.214 24.944 1 .000 -22.351 -9.753 
[detective_101-500] -18.071 3.333 29.399 1 .000 -24.603 -11.539 
[detective_=>500] 0
a
     0       
[monitoring_=1] 17.147 .666 662.583 1 .000 15.841 18.452 
[monitoring_=51-100] 16.585 0.000   1   16.585 16.585 
[monitoring_101-500] 0
a
     0       
[COUNTERFEIT=1] 3.629 3.041 1.424 1 .233 -2.331 9.589 
[COUNTERFEIT =2] 1.239 1.198 1.069 1 .301 -1.109 3.587 
[COUNTERFEIT =3] .807 1.084 .554 1 .457 -1.318 2.932 
[COUNTERFEIT =4] 1.793 1.084 2.736 1 .098 -.332 3.917 
[COUNTERFEIT =5] 0
a
     0       
[COUNTERFEIT =1] -.060 2.616 .001 1 .982 -5.187 5.067 
[Fake SMS=2] -.595 2.625 .051 1 .821 -5.740 4.549 
[Fake SMS =3] .921 2.583 .127 1 .721 -4.142 5.984 
[Fake SMS =4] 1.866 2.681 .484 1 .486 -3.389 7.120 
[Fake SMS =5] 0
a
     0       
[Card skimming=1] 1.578 1.406 1.259 1 .262 -1.179 4.334 
[Card skimming =2] -1.113 .896 1.542 1 .214 -2.870 .644 
[Card skimming =3] -2.317 .827 7.841 1 .005 -3.938 -.695 
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[Card skimming =4] -1.022 .691 2.189 1 .139 -2.375 .332 
[Card skimming =5] 0
a
     0       
[identity theft=1] -3.752 1.210 9.621 1 .002 -6.123 -1.381 
[identity theft =2] .092 .832 .012 1 .912 -1.538 1.722 
[identity theft =3] -1.285 .768 2.802 1 .094 -2.789 .220 
[identity theft =4] .146 .706 .043 1 .837 -1.238 1.530 
[identity theft =5] 0
a
     0       
[Fake ATMs=2] 1.214 1.588 .584 1 .445 -1.898 4.327 
[Fake ATMs=3] 2.067 .816 6.417 1 .011 .468 3.666 
[Fake ATMs=4] -.210 .603 .121 1 .727 -1.391 .971 
[Fake ATMs=5] 0
a
     0       
[Split deposits=1] 1.815 3.506 .268 1 .605 -5.057 8.687 
[Split deposits =2] .876 .945 .860 1 .354 -.975 2.727 
[Split deposits =3] -.466 .753 .383 1 .536 -1.943 1.010 
[Split deposits =4] -.136 .732 .034 1 .853 -1.571 1.300 
[Split deposits =5] 0
a
     0       
[Unauthorized PIN 
access=1] 
1.508 1.262 1.428 1 .232 -.965 3.981 
[Unauthorized PIN 
access =2] 
2.224 .915 5.908 1 .015 .431 4.017 
[Unauthorized PIN 
access =3] 
2.855 .844 11.445 1 .001 1.201 4.509 
[Unauthorized PIN 
access =4] 





     0       
[Extortion=1] .741 .975 .578 1 .447 -1.170 2.653 
[Extortion =2] 1.791 1.087 2.713 1 .100 -.340 3.922 
[Extortion =3] -.413 1.007 .168 1 .682 -2.386 1.561 
[Extortion =4] .986 1.035 .906 1 .341 -1.044 3.015 
[Extortion =5] 0
a
     0       
[Unauthorized 
charges=1] 
-.974 1.374 .502 1 .478 -3.666 1.719 
[Unauthorized charges 
=2] 
.097 .908 .011 1 .915 -1.682 1.876 
[Unauthorized charges 
=3] 
-1.051 .799 1.731 1 .188 -2.616 .515 
[Unauthorized charges 
=4] 





     0       
[registration with fake 
details=2] 
-1.266 1.994 .403 1 .525 -5.174 2.642 
[registration with fake 
details =3] 
.536 .727 .543 1 .461 -.889 1.960 
[registration with fake 
details =4] 
1.658 .623 7.086 1 .008 .437 2.878 
[registration with fake 0
a






-1.965 1.431 1.885 1 .170 -4.770 .840 
[access of 
transactional data =3] 
.055 .758 .005 1 .942 -1.431 1.541 
[access of 
transactional data =4] 
-.663 .577 1.321 1 .250 -1.794 .468 
[access of 
transactional data =5] 
0
a
     0       
[collusion with 
customers=1] 
-.668 1.467 .208 1 .649 -3.544 2.207 
[collusion with 
customers =2] 
1.736 .909 3.646 1 .056 -.046 3.517 
[collusion with 
customers =3] 
3.464 .906 14.627 1 .000 1.689 5.239 
[collusion with 
customers =4] 





     0       
[ business Age=1] .399 1.699 .055 1 .814 -2.931 3.729 
[business Age =2] 1.567 1.609 .949 1 .330 -1.586 4.721 
[business Age =3] 2.081 1.539 1.828 1 .176 -.935 5.097 
[business Age =4] .631 1.610 .153 1 .695 -2.524 3.785 
[business Age =5] 0
a
     0       
[Stand alone or 
other=1] 
.221 .571 .150 1 .699 -.898 1.339 




     0       
[ownership=1] -.847 1.004 .711 1 .399 -2.814 1.121 
[Ownership=2] 0
a
     0       
Link function: Logit. 

























































 Very effective 101 84.9 84.9 84.9 
Effective 8 6.7 6.7 91.6 
Neutral 8 6.7 6.7 98.3 
Ineffective 1 .8 .8 99.2 
Highly ineffective 1 .8 .8 100.0 
 
 Preventive      
 Very effective 119 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Response       
 Very effective 26 21.8 21.8 21.8 
Effective 36 30.3 30.3 52.1 
Neutral 48 40.3 40.3 92.4 
Ineffective 8 6.7 6.7 99.2 
Highly ineffective 1 .8 .8 100.0 
     
 Detective     
 Very effective 47 39.5 39.5 39.5 
Effective 11 9.2 9.2 48.7 
Neutral 56 47.1 47.1 95.8 
Ineffective 3 2.5 2.5 98.3 
Highly ineffective 2 1.7 1.7 100.0 
     
  
Monitoring and training 
    
 Very effective 16 13.4 13.4 13.4 
Effective 10 8.4 8.4 21.8 
Neutral 79 66.4 66.4 88.2 
Ineffective 9 7.6 7.6 95.8 
Highly ineffective 5 4.2 4.2 100.0 


















effective Effective  Neutral  Ineffective  
Highly 
ineffective 
Process checks .713     
Training   .667   
Corrective checks   .063   
Know Your Customer  .794    
Whistle blowing  .683    
Monitoring & supervision   .729   
Mystery shopping   .696   
Management .858     
Structured agent feedback sessions    -.529  










  Initial Extraction 
Policies and responsibilities 1.000 .599 
Fraud reporting procedures 1.000 .560 
Fraud risk identification 1.000 .644 
Understanding code of conduct 1.000 .376 
Monitoring  & training 1.000 .438 
Whistle blowing 1.000 .577 
Investigation procedures 1.000 .725 
